Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release by Doherty, Fiona
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-3\NYU303.txt unknown Seq: 1 13-MAY-13 13:32
INDETERMINATE SENTENCING RETURNS:
THE INVENTION OF SUPERVISED
RELEASE
FIONA DOHERTY*
The determinacy revolution in federal sentencing, which culminated in the passage
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, has since been upended by a little-noticed
phenomenon: the evolution of federal supervised release. A “determinate” sen-
tencing regime requires that prison terms be of fixed and absolute duration at the
time of sentencing. Because of the manner in which supervised release now oper-
ates, however, contemporary federal prison terms are neither fixed nor absolute.
Instead, the court has discretion to adjust the length of a prison term after sen-
tencing based on its evaluation of the post-judgment progress of the offender. This
power to amend the duration of the penalty is the classic marker of the “indetermi-
nate” sentence.
In this Article, I show how federal supervised release has dismantled the ambitions
of the determinacy movement and made federal prison terms structurally indetermi-
nate in length. I conclude that the widespread use of supervised release has created
a muddled and unprincipled form of indeterminate sentencing: one that flouts the
insights and vision of the nineteenth-century indeterminacy movement as well as the
twentieth-century determinacy movement. Having dislocated once-celebrated theo-
ries of sentencing, federal supervised release now controls the lives of more than
100,000 people without offering any alternative theoretical basis for doing so. This
Article draws on the lessons of a 200-year history to expose the current nature of
supervised release and to envision a more coherent role for its future.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) emerged from a
determinacy revolution that sought to establish certainty and trans-
parency in the length of federal prison terms.1 The statute
1 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2012), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_1.pdf (noting that in enacting
the SRA, Congress “first sought honesty in sentencing”). Congress “sought to avoid the
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prospectively abolished federal parole, which had provided a mecha-
nism for the early, discretionary release of federal prisoners. After the
passage of the SRA, a prison sentence imposed by a federal court at
judgment was supposed to be “determinate,”2 or definite, in length.
Under this framework, the prison sentence originally imposed would
be the prison sentence actually served—with no possibility of the
kinds of discretionary adjustments in length that had characterized
federal sentencing under the parole system.3
In place of parole, the SRA created supervised release, a new
system of post-incarceration supervision.4 Supervised release imposes
conditions on a person’s behavior after he or she is released into the
community, but it does not substitute for part of a prison sentence. It
instead follows the completed prison sentence imposed at judgment.
Supervised release, as originally conceived, was a form of community
supervision that was consistent with the imposition of a determinate
prison term.
This Article argues that supervised release, as it has evolved, has
usurped the determinacy revolution by making federal prison terms
“indeterminate,” or indefinite, in length. It explains how determinacy
in federal sentencing unraveled, despite the political and intellectual
energy expended on implementing it in the name of “truth in
sentencing.”
First, soon after the SRA’s passage, Congress created a revoca-
tion procedure that allows judges to return people to prison for vio-
lating the conditions of their supervised release, including conditions
prohibiting behavior that is not criminal.5 Second, federal courts justi-
fied this revocation scheme by framing reincarceration as additional
confusion and implicit deception that arose out of the pre-guidelines sentencing system,
which required the court to impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and
empowered the parole commission to determine how much of the sentence an offender
actually would serve in prison.” Id.; see also Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody,
Determinate Sentencing and Abolishing Parole: The Long-Term Impact on Prisons and
Crime, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 108 (1996) (“A defendant given a determinate sentence can
estimate the actual term to be served by taking the sentence length set by the judge and
subtracting credits expected, such as those for pretrial detention and good time in
prison.”).
2 In this Article, I do not use “determinate” to refer to the goal of guidelines-based
sentencing, which is to create presumptive prison terms for specific crimes to eliminate
disparity across defendants convicted of the same or similar crimes.
3 See discussion infra Part III.B.
4 Supervised release did not displace federal probation. In the federal system, proba-
tion has always been an alternative to incarceration, whereas supervised release can only
be imposed to supplement incarceration. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
5 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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punishment for the underlying crime, as opposed to punishment for
the supervised release violation.6
These developments render the time spent in prison for the
underlying crime variable, creating prison sentences that are structur-
ally indeterminate.7 The system tailors the period of incarceration
based on post-judgment assessments of the rehabilitative progress of
the offender and the danger posed to the public by his or her presence
in the community.
This Article is the product of my efforts to locate and understand
the historical and conceptual roots of supervised release. By investi-
gating the system’s nineteenth-century antecedents, I have come to
understand that “supervised release” is a misnomer: It incorrectly
implies a period of release that is supervised and disguises the true
nature of what the system has become. Supervised release is better
described as what I call “conditional release,” a mechanism that I
trace back to the Australian ticket of leave at the turn of the nine-
teenth century. Conditional release is a method of release from con-
finement that is contingent upon obeying conditions of release under
threat of revocation (return to prison) under reduced due process pro-
tections. As a form of conditional release, supervised release has rein-
troduced widespread indeterminate sentencing into the federal
system.
Although the supervised release system produces indeterminacy,
it does not reflect the principles of the nineteenth-century advocates
of indeterminate sentencing. Nor does supervised release serve
the goals of certainty and transparency advanced by the twentieth-
century proponents of the determinate sentence. In fact, no
clear penological or adjudicative principles validate supervised
release in its current form. Neither the case law, the academic lit-
erature, nor the legislative history contains a conceptual or practi-
cal defense of the system as it now exists.8 And yet, the issue is
6 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
7 See U.N. DEP’T OF SOC. AFFAIRS, THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE 1 (1954)
(describing the core features of indeterminate sentencing regimes).
8 Articles that do examine supervised release tend to concentrate on controversial
conditions, such as shaming sanctions and bans on Internet use and pornography. Little
attention has been paid to the conceptual framework underlying supervised release. The
same has been true of academic treatment of parole systems more generally. See Joan
Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to Communities: Political, Economic, and Social
Consequences, FED. PROBATION, June 2001, at 3, 6 (“It is safe to say that parole has
received less research attention in recent years than any other part of the correctional
system.”).
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not an abstract one, given the number of people on supervised
release.9
In this Article, I demonstrate that the roots of supervised release,
specifically as a system of indeterminate sentencing and conditional
release, are to be found not in the history of the SRA, but in the
system the SRA was designed to replace. Indeed, these practices have
a pedigree almost as old as the systematized use of imprisonment as a
penal sanction (at least in the United States),10 although their history
is much harder to find. The names and ideas of the foundational theo-
rists of indeterminacy and conditional release—most directly,
Alexander Maconochie and Walter Crofton—have all but disap-
peared from contemporary scholarship. I returned to the nineteenth-
century sources to learn what their writings might reveal about the
conceptual underpinnings of our modern-day system.
Returning to these sources revealed that the path to supervised
release has been characterized by short-lived innovation and historical
forgetting. In this Article, I show how many of the principles that orig-
inally gave rise to indeterminacy (and eventually parole) resemble the
concerns that later motivated the rise of determinacy (and the end of
parole). These connections were not apparent in the 1980s, in part
because parole had strayed too far from its advocates’ original vision.
Supervised release, I will argue, has done the same.
The lack of any clear philosophy or purpose has not slowed the
growth of supervised release. The last twenty-five years have seen an
enormous expansion in its scope, both in terms of the number of
people impacted and the breadth of the conditions imposed.11 Periods
of supervised release regularly trigger reimprisonment, meted out at
hearings with minimal due process protections and followed by addi-
tional periods of supervised release, all attributable to the same
underlying crime. Select offenses, including federal drug trafficking
crimes, now carry the possibility of lifetime supervised release.
Post-release supervision and revocation have become normalized
to such an extent, in both federal and state practice, that it is hard to
conceive of a time when such concepts were new and controver-
sial. The documents from the nineteenth century, however, reveal a
lively debate about whether any extension of penal control into the
9 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2010, at 8 (2011), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus10.pdf (reporting
that by the end of 2010, there were 103,423 people on supervised release).
10 See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Sanction of Imprisonment for
Serious Crime, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 36 (1976) (noting that Europeans used imprisonment
as a penal sanction before the United States).
11 See discussion infra Parts IV.E–F.
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community impedes or encourages meaningful reintegration. By
explicating the indeterminacy of our current federal sentencing
system, I hope to reopen that discussion.
The ultimate aim of this Article is to seek a more considered
approach to supervised release. Building on the insights of the
indeterminists and determinists, I present three alternative
approaches for assessing supervised release going forward. First, I
offer a framework for analyzing supervised release as a crime-control
mechanism of deterrence and incapacitation. Second, I imagine how
supervised release could be restructured to make it a coherent tool of
transitional rehabilitation. Third, I consider the complete elimination
of supervised release as a means of restoring honesty and certainty to
prison sentencing and respecting the autonomy of released offenders.
Deciding which of these approaches to pursue would require a settled
and principled understanding of the purposes of supervised release.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I unearths the ideas
behind the indeterminacy movement and explores the early debates
over conditional release. Part II examines how U.S. reformers
imported the principles of Maconochie and Crofton into the United
States and describes how adherence to these principles had dissipated
by the time federal parole was adopted in 1910. Part III analyzes the
core ideas of the determinacy movement, which led to the SRA and
the overthrow of federal parole. Part IV describes the emergence and
evolution of supervised release, focusing on how the supervised
release system has come to reincorporate indeterminacy and condi-
tional release into the federal system. Part V begins the work of
reimagining supervised release for the future.12
I
THE RISE OF INDETERMINACY AND
CONDITIONAL RELEASE
In this Part, I investigate the separate motivations that underlay
the development of conditional release and the subsequent rise of the
indeterminate sentencing movement. I explore the roots of condi-
tional release by examining the ticket-of-leave system, an early form
of conditional release that emerged in the Australian penal colonies at
the turn of the nineteenth century. I also examine the ideas of
12 Although this Article focuses on federal supervised release, the issues presented are
also relevant to many states’ practices. Like the federal government, many states abolished
parole release in the 1970s and 1980s, but continued to embrace and expand post-release
supervision programs at the same time. See JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK:
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY 45–46 (2005) (describing these trends in
state practice).
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Alexander Maconochie, a Scottish penal reformer who is broadly rec-
ognized as the primary architect of the indeterminacy movement.13
First, I want to clarify the relationship between conditional
release and indeterminacy theory, particularly as this theory was con-
ceived by Maconochie. A sentence that provides for conditional
release necessarily creates an indeterminate (that is, indefinite) prison
term. But conditional release is not the only means of creating an
indeterminate sentence: A person can serve a prison term of indefinite
length and then be released without condition into the community.
Indeed, as I shall explain below, Maconochie developed his theory of
indeterminacy in the late 1830s largely in reaction against the idea of
conditional release as embodied in the Australian ticket of leave.
Indeterminacy theory, however, would later come to embrace
conditional release. Walter Crofton incorporated conditional release
into indeterminacy theory in Ireland in the mid-1850s. Crofton chaired
the Irish Convict Board when tickets of leave first were being imple-
mented into domestic law in England and Ireland. Over the next sev-
eral decades, reformers used the ideas of Maconochie—as adapted by
Crofton—to justify the introduction of what they called parole (inde-
terminate sentencing with conditional release) into the United States.
The writings of Maconochie and Crofton, now largely forgotten, pro-
vide important insights into the central elements of supervised release
as it operates today.14
A. The Australian Penal Colonies
Any investigation of the doctrine of supervised release in Anglo-
American law must begin in the Australian penal colonies. Between
1788 and 1867, the United Kingdom transported to the Australian col-
onies more than 150,000 people, mostly from England and Ireland, as
punishment for their crimes.15 In managing these penal colonies, the
British government experimented with systems of conditional release
13 See, e.g., U.N. DEP’T OF SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 7, at 12 (“The originator of the
whole movement leading to the indeterminate sentence was . . . undoubtedly Alexander
Maconochie.”).
14 The writings of Maconochie and Crofton come out of a particularized nineteenth-
century male British discourse that made many assumptions about how the world oper-
ated, including the proper position of the British government and the innate characteristics
of criminals, women, the poor, and other groups. In this Article, I analyze the systems
advocated by Maconochie and Crofton in light of the roles they played in the indetermi-
nacy movement. More work needs to be done, however, to examine critically the develop-
ment of these ideas, their semantic presentation, and their implementation in the broader
social, economic, and political context of the nineteenth century.
15 Helen Leland Witmer, The History, Theory and Results of Parole, 18 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 24, 30 (1927).
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as a means of rewarding good behavior and integrating offenders into
Australian society.16
Because the U.K. government assumed the cost of transporting
offenders to Australia, the colonial governor was awarded “property
in service” of the offenders for the duration of their sentences. Some
transported convicts labored in the custody of the colonial govern-
ment, mainly in prisons or on the public works.17 Most, however, were
assigned to free settlers by a colonial Board of Assignment.18 Once
assigned, convicts worked without wages: The masters paid a fixed
sum to the government to cover the cost of their maintenance.19
By 1800, the colonial government had received the power to
grant tickets of leave to transported convicts before the end of their
sentences. These tickets excused convicts from further government or
assigned work “during good behavior or until His Excellency’s further
pleasure shall be made known.”20 In 1821, the ticket-of-leave system
was standardized, with those prisoners serving seven-year transporta-
tion terms becoming eligible for a ticket of leave after four years,
those with fourteen-year terms eligible after six years, and those with
life terms eligible after eight years.21 The ticket of leave was framed as
an indulgence, one that provided “hope to a convict if he behaved
well,” but could be revoked “in case of misconduct.”22
There has been a misperception in the scholarly literature that
there was little or no government supervision of ticket-of-leave
holders in Australia.23 This is contradicted by a number of period
16 See SELECT COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, REPORT, 1837-8, H.C., at xvii (U.K.)
[hereinafter SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT] (describing the conditional release system in the
Australian penal colonies).
17 I use the term “convict” in this Section because that is the term used in contempora-
neous accounts.
18 JOHN VINCENT BARRY, ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE OF NORFOLK ISLAND 25, 42
(1958).
19 See SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 114 (discussing the payment
system for assignment in New South Wales).
20 Frederick A. Moran, The Origins of Parole, 1945 Y.B. NAT’L PROBATION ASS’N 71,
78 (quoting the ticket of leave).
21 Id.
22 SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at xvii.
23 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 4 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES: PAROLE 12 (1939) (reporting that before Maconochie’s experiments, those
on tickets of leave were released into the community without any supervision); see also
DAVID DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 49 (1959)
(asserting that there was “no government supervision of the ticket-of-leave recipient” in
Australia); WILLIAM C. PARKER, PAROLE: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, CURRENT PRACTICES
AND STATUTES 17 (1975) (claiming a lack of government supervision of those on tickets of
leave).
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sources, most particularly by the writings of Maconochie.24 Just before
Maconochie left for Australia in 1836, the London Society for the
Improvement of Prison Discipline had asked him to investigate
the treatment of transported convicts in Van Diemen’s Land
(now Tasmania), the largest of the penal colonies.25 The British
Undersecretary of Colonies approved this request, but required
Maconochie to transmit communications on the subject to the
Secretary of State, rather than to the Society.26 Upon his arrival,
Maconochie took heartily to the task. He prepared a series of reports
for the government, which would prove highly influential in parlia-
mentary reforms of the transportation system.
In historical accounts, Maconochie became widely—and incor-
rectly—cited as a founding father of the ticket of leave.27 These
accounts described Maconochie as having initiated or revitalized that
system. In truth, Maconochie criticized the very concept of conditional
release as embodied in its earliest known example: the Australian
ticket of leave.28
In his first reports from Australia, dated October 1837,
Maconochie described a system of active supervision of convicts on
24 See, e.g., CHARLES B. GIBSON, IRISH CONVICT REFORM: THE INTERMEDIATE
PRISONS, A MISTAKE 8 (Dublin, McGlashan & Gill 1863) (describing the government’s
monitoring system for ticket-of-leave holders in Australia); English Convicts: What Should
Be Done with Them, 23 WESTMINSTER & FOREIGN Q. REV. 1, 2–3 (1863) (noting that
conditions on colonial tickets of leave were rigorously enforced through revocation and
reimprisonment).
25 BARRY, supra note 18, at 20. Maconochie went to Australia as the private secretary
for the new governor of Van Diemen’s Land. Previously, he had served as a captain in the
Royal Navy, as the first Secretary of the Royal Geographic Society, and as a professor of
geography at University College London. R. Gerard Ward, Captain Alexander
Maconochie, R.N., K.H., 1787–1860, 126 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 459, 459, 460 (1960).
26 BARRY, supra note 18, at 20 (quoting A. Maconochie, Report on Convict Discipline,
in 7 ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, SESSION 1837–1838, at 5, 5
(1838)).
27 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 49 (reporting that “the ticket-of-leave plan lay
comparatively fallow until Alexander Maconochie arrived in Australia”); JOHN LEWIS
GILLIN, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY, 565 (3d ed. 1945) (1926) (citing W. L. CLAY, OUR
CONVICT SYSTEMS 21 (Cambridge, Macmillan and Co. 1862)) (suggesting that Maconochie
was responsible for the idea of conditional release in Australia); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 23, at 12 (claiming that Maconochie was a leading force in the development of
the Australian ticket-of-leave system); Witmer, supra note 15, at 27, 28 (describing
Machonochie’s mark system as a piece of the probation system implemented in Australia
in 1842). In a 1976 article, written while he was a fellow for the Department of Law and
Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University, Stephen White
pointed out many of these misattributions. Stephen White, Criminology: Alexander
Maconochie and the Development of Parole, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 72, 72–73
(1976).
28 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 10 (noting that the “earliest plan of condi-
tional liberation” was developed in the Australian penal colonies).
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tickets of leave. Ticket-of-leave holders had to live in allotted districts,
where they had an 8:00 p.m. curfew and had to report any change of
address to the police. Although allowed to keep their wages, they
could not own property and were required to attend frequent musters,
or check-ins. Tickets of leave could be suspended in summary fashion
for what Maconochie termed the most “trifling irregularities,” and a
“very large proportion” of ticket-of-leave holders were returned to
government work as a result.29
Maconochie’s reports criticized almost every aspect of the
Australian convict system, including the ticket of leave. He con-
demned the framework of severe coercive discipline applied to con-
victs in both government and assigned work, including the rampant
use of the lash, hard labor, and other debilitating punishments.
Maconochie argued that a disciplinary system premised on physical
abuse imposed with little process or restraint served only to humiliate
and demoralize offenders. It also degraded their masters, turning
them into overbearing, dissatisfied “slave-holders,” too ready to resort
to violence and coercion.30 For prisoners, such a system inspired only
fear and resistance.31 For Maconochie, without an emphasis on the
dignity of prisoners as social beings, there was no space for their
meaningful reform.32
Reacting against what he had seen, Maconochie proposed his
once-famous mark system of convict administration. Rather than a
“time” sentence based on years, he sought the imposition of a “task”
sentence based on labor and good conduct. Depending on the serious-
ness of the crime, a judge would impose a sentence of a specific
number of marks as a form of prison currency. That prisoner would
then receive concrete incentives, measured in marks, to earn release
as early as possible. The ideas behind Maconochie’s mark system
would lead to a revolution in criminal sentencing, particularly in the
United States.33
Maconochie accepted the idea of punishment as a mechanism of
social control, but he focused on making the sentence productive and
29 ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE, AUSTRALIANA: THOUGHTS ON CONVICT MANAGEMENT
AND OTHER SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE AUSTRALIAN PENAL COLONIES 3–4
(London, John W. Parker 1938).
30 Id. at 6, 12.
31 Id. at 5–6, 11–12.
32 See BARRY, supra note 18, at 77–78 (quoting MACONOCHIE, supra note 26, at 25–26
(describing Maconochie’s philosophy on prisoner reform)).
33 Several noted European scholars—such as Obermaier in Bavaria, Montesinos in
Spain, and Bonneville de Marsangy and Charles Lucas in France—were advocating for
reform-based indeterminate sentencing around the same time as Maconochie. U.N. DEP’T
OF SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 7, at 12.
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geared toward reintegration.34 In this, he was preoccupied with
avoiding degradation in the execution of the sentence. Rather than
relying on the threat of external coercion, he sought to ignite a
prisoner’s internal drive to succeed.35 The mark system was meant to
recognize and reward the achievements of prisoners.
Under the mark system, each prisoner had to earn a set number
of marks, calculated in proportion to the seriousness of the offense, in
order to qualify for release.36 The use of marks was developed in a
labor-based system, but release did not depend solely on physical
exertion: Prisoners could earn marks for obeying the rules and
through tasks such as attention and proficiency in school, reading
aloud to others, and tending the sick.37 Prisoners had to pay for food
and clothing out of their marks: This was to encourage them to choose
simpler rations in order to secure earlier release. Discipline would be
addressed through the loss of marks, rather than through physical
punishment.38 Importantly for Maconochie, the gain and loss of marks
was meant to be concrete and measurable, recorded from day to day,
rather than at some distant point in the future.39
As prisoners earned the requisite number of marks and advanced
through the stages of Maconochie’s system, the restraints upon them
lessened. The final stage of confinement was meant to resemble as
much as possible the real-world circumstances the prisoners would
encounter upon release.40 Maconochie’s stated aim was to allow pris-
oners to earn early remission of their sentences and at the same time
to provide them with the skills and motivation to reenter society suc-
cessfully.41 Through these ideas, Maconochie laid the foundations for
34 BARRY, supra note 18, at 72–73.
35 ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 42 (London, J. Hatchard &
Son 1846) (arguing for a change in the incentive structure to produce more meaningful
reform).
36 Under Maconochie’s system, punishment and reform were to be contemplated as
separate objectives of the sentence. The first stage of the sentence would be punishment:
Prisoners would be put to hard labor for short fixed periods in penal stations removed
from the public. The second stage would be rehabilitative: Prisoners would earn marks
independently and then in probationary groups of six, whose members chose one another.
MACONOCHIE, supra note 29, at 17–18.
37 See M.D. Hill, Society for Promoting the Amendment of Law, Report, in
MACONOCHIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 35, at 49, 55 (describing the operation
of the mark system).
38 BARRY, supra note 18, at 75; MACONOCHIE, supra note 29, at 18, 21. In a set of
regulations proposed in 1840, however, Maconochie reserved the possibility of flogging
and chains if deemed “absolutely necessary for security.” BARRY, supra note 18, at 118.
39 See 1 ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE, ON SECONDARY PUNISHMENT 3–4 (London,
Walton & Mitchell 1856) (discussing the philosophy and logistics of the mark system).
40 BARRY, supra note 18, at 75.
41 Id. at 72–73 (drawing from Maconochie’s regulations proposed in 1840).
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the indeterminate sentencing movement, which placed great confi-
dence in the potential of penal programs to inspire and achieve mean-
ingful reform.
Maconochie designed his mark system to counteract the disparity
and unfairness he had witnessed in the Australian ticket-of-leave
system. In his reports back home, he criticized the ticket-of-leave pro-
cess as too remote an incentive, too uncertain for prisoners, and too
dependent on the discretion of sometimes indifferent masters.42 In
designing his system, he conceived of marks as a transparent mea-
suring stick of a prisoner’s progress.43 To avoid abuses in the tabula-
tion of marks, he provided for the public display of fixed tables of
wages and fines. Inferior authorities could not deviate from these
tables.44 The accounts of each prisoner would be kept public in order
to make the system open, invite scrutiny, and avoid corruption.45
Critically, Maconochie did not believe in the conditional nature
of tickets of leave—that is, the possibility that release could be sum-
marily terminated—at least for those who had gone through his
system. He worried that post-release police supervision would impede
reintegration and advocated against what he termed “clogging” a
ticket of leave with restrictions.46 He maintained that prisoners who
had earned their freedom should not become “slaves to the police”47
or subject to the discretionary will of a “malicious constable, or a
single irritable magistrate.”48 In particular, he disparaged summary
powers at revocation, emphasizing that “[s]ummary power is a snare
alike to those who wield, and those who are subject to it.”49 Upon
release, prisoners should receive the same safeguards and protections
as “those claimed by the very highest,”50 having “most dearly earned”
their freedom.51 The system he devised was indeterminate because the
length of confinement was contingent upon an inmate’s behavior. But
release, when achieved, would be unconditional.
Maconochie was not alone in worrying about the effects of stig-
matizing released offenders. In 1837, the British parliamentary
42 MACONOCHIE, supra note 29, at 3 (cataloging problems with the ticket-of-leave
system).
43 Cf. BARRY, supra note 18, at 77 (pointing out that this measuring stick approach was
derived from Quaker reformers).
44 Hill, supra note 37, at 56.
45 Id. at 57.
46 MACONOCHIE, supra note 29, at 22.
47 Id. at 11.
48 Id. at 75.
49 Id. at 22.
50 Id. at 75.
51 Id. at 22.
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committee charged with reviewing the transportation system—a com-
mittee that drew extensively on Maconochie’s findings—cautioned
that “under a good system of punishment,” an offender should be con-
sidered to have atoned for his crime at the expiration of the sen-
tence.52 In particular, the committee emphasized:
[T]he effect of preventing an offender from acquiring civil and con-
stitutional rights after the expiration of his sentence, is in reality to
give a most unjust, uncertain, and unequal extension to his punish-
ment, to render him infamous in the eyes of his fellow-citizens, to
degrade him in his own estimation, and to drive him back to
crime.53
Between 1840 and 1844, Maconochie had an opportunity to
implement his methods (at least partially) in his famed experiments at
Norfolk Island, the most notorious of the penal settlements, located
approximately 900 miles off the coast of Sydney.54 Although
Maconochie spent only four years as the governor of Norfolk Island,
his achievements in bringing order out of chaos have been celebrated
extensively in historical accounts.55 As explained in Part II,
Maconochie’s writings and his accomplishments at Norfolk Island pro-
foundly influenced the penal reformers who brought indeterminacy
into the United States.
52 SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at xxix.
53 Id.
54 Maconochie was not allowed to put all his proposals into operation. Most signifi-
cantly, the colonial government did not endorse Maconochie’s plan for early release based
on the accumulation of marks. He could only hold marks out as “affording grounds for
expectation,” but was eventually disappointed in this. ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE, THE
MARK SYSTEM OF PRISON DISCIPLINE 4 (London, Mitchell and Son 1857); see also White,
supra note 27, at 73–80 (describing how Maconochie was forced to implement tickets of
leave at Norfolk Island because of the limitations in the law). However, on the whole his
views were “unfavorable towards those elements in ticket-of-leave systems which devel-
oped into parole, especially when he had the power to do anything about them.” White,
supra note 27, at 74. Towards the end of his life, however, Maconochie defended the idea
of using tickets of leave in England, perhaps under the influence of his friend, Matthew
Davenport Hill. ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE, PRISON DISCIPLINE 21 (London, T. Harrison
1856).
55 See, e.g., BARRY, supra note 18, at 167–71 (discussing contemporary accounts of
Maconochie’s success at Norfolk Island); MARY CARPENTER, REFORMATORY PRISON
DISCIPLINE xiii (London, Longman Longman Green Longman 1872) (“Captain
Maconochie effected probably the greatest triumphs of reformatory prison discipline ever
attained, in Norfolk Island, in 1840.”); NORVAL MORRIS, MACONOCHIE’S GENTLEMEN 164
(2002) (noting the remarkable success achieved at Norfolk Island). But see, e.g., BARRY,
supra note 18, at 171–75 (discussing contemporaneous criticisms of Maconochie’s prisoner
reform program).
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B. The Irish and English Convict Systems
Maconochie’s mark system did not achieve any real prominence
in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, however, until Sir Walter
Crofton revived and adapted it for the Irish prison system in the
mid-1850s.56 Crofton, a former English county magistrate, chaired the
Board of Directors of Convict Prisons for Ireland between 1854 and
1862.57
Crofton is regularly portrayed as Maconochie’s ideological heir.58
Both Crofton and Maconochie believed that allowing prisoners to
earn their way out of prison was the key to meaningful reform. In
Crofton’s words, rehabilitation was possible when a convict was
treated as the “arbiter of his own fate”59 and persuaded through con-
crete rewards to begin “co-operating in his own amendment.”60 To
this end, Crofton drew on Maconochie’s mark system as a means of
measuring and rewarding reform.
In important ways that have not been addressed in the scholarly
literature, however, Crofton changed Maconochie’s program by
embracing conditional release. It was Crofton’s system—which incor-
porated conditional release into indeterminacy theory61—that was
adopted into the United States. On the question of whether to make
release from prison conditional, the true heir to Maconochie’s ideas
was Sir Joshua Jebb, not Crofton.
Jebb, the longtime chair of the Board of Directors of Convict
Prisons for England, was Crofton’s archrival. Jebb entered penology
as a royal engineer and became Surveyor-General of Prisons in 1844.
He was first appointed to chair the English Convict Board in 1850.62
Crofton and Jebb led the Irish and English Convict Boards
during a critical period in the mid-1850s that involved domestic
56 CLAY, supra note 27, at 22.
57 The Present State of the Prison Discipline Question, 102 N. AM. REV. 210, 220–21
(1866).
58 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 13 (stating that Crofton based his
system of marks and stages on Maconochie’s system).
59 Walter Crofton, The Irish System of Prison Discipline, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE
NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 66, 67 (E.C.
Wines ed., Albany, The Argus Company 1871).
60 WALTER CROFTON, CONVICT SYSTEMS AND TRANSPORTATION 9 (London, William
Ridgway 1863).
61 Any prison system that provides for conditional release is indeterminate in the sense
that the time in confinement is indefinite. However, Maconochie developed a theory of
indeterminate sentencing that rejected conditional release. See infra Part I.A. While
Crofton relied heavily on Maconochie’s theory, he also adapted it to include conditional
release.
62 See Eric Stockdale, The Rise of Joshua Jebb, 1837–1850, 16 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
164, 170 (1976).
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experimentation with tickets of leave in the British Isles. Van
Diemen’s Land, the main Australian penal colony, had closed its
doors to transported convicts in 1852, creating sudden pressure on the
authorities to absorb convicts at home.63 In response to this crisis, the
British Parliament passed a penal servitude act in 1853 that authorized
limited conditional release in England and Ireland under an adapta-
tion of the colonial ticket-of-leave system.64 Convicts under sentence
of transportation could now receive tickets of leave at home after a
minimum period of penal servitude.65
Crofton used tickets of leave as the final step in what became
known as the “Irish Convict System.” Prisoners had to pass through
three stages before they were eligible for remission on tickets of leave.
During the first stage, the penal stage, prisoners were held in solitary
cells for approximately nine months.66 The second stage involved
communal labor in public works prisons.67 For this stage, Crofton
adapted Maconochie’s mark system;68 prisoners had to advance
through four different classes by earning a set tally of marks.69 By
advancing through these classes, prisoners earned a progressive les-
sening of restraint, more interesting labor, and an increase in gratui-
ties.70 For the third stage, officials promoted prisoners in small
numbers to “intermediate” prisons as a final test of their readiness for
tickets of leave.71 In the intermediate prisons, the inmates dressed as
ordinary laborers, lived communally under minimal surveillance, and
could run errands and attend church in the community.72
63 CLAY, supra note 27, at 29–30.
64 CROFTON, supra note 60, at 3.
65 Id.
66 WALTER CROFTON, NOTES ON COLONEL JEBB’S REPORT ON INTERMEDIATE
PRISONS 1 (1858).
67 Id.
68 CROFTON, supra note 60, at 8. Prisoners forfeited marks for misconduct. See
CARPENTER, supra note 55, at 8 (referencing Crofton’s description of the Irish Convict
System).
69 See CROFTON, supra note 66, at 2–3 (listing four classes in a convict gratuity table,
and stating that progress through these classes would be based on the accumulation of
marks).
70 Crofton, supra note 59, at 67.
71 See CROFTON, supra note 66, at 4 (discussing the purpose of the third stage). Pris-
oners, here, means male prisoners. Crofton did not approve of intermediate facilities for
female convicts; he believed “there would be considerable difficulty in obtaining employ-
ment for them on Discharge.” Id. at 24.
72 See CARPENTER, supra note 55, at 42 (quoting E.B. WHEATLEY BALME, EDWARD
AKROYD, SAML. WATERHOUSE, & THOS. FOLJAMBE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE TREATMENT
OF CONVICTS IN IRELAND 38 (London, Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. 1862) (providing an
account by four English prison magistrates who visited one of Crofton’s intermediate
prisons and noted that prisoners attended church and dressed as ordinary laborers); CLAY,
supra note 27, at 49 (noting communal living, minimal surveillance, and dress as ordinary
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Like Maconochie, Crofton worked to make the prisoner advance-
ment system transparent and uniform. During the second stage, the
mark stage, prisoners could earn nine marks per month: three for
discipline; three for attention and improvement at school; and three
for industry at work.73 Prison officials, including the governor and
schoolmaster, awarded these marks, and prisoners had the right to
appeal.74 Prisoners wore “conduct” badges on their arms, showing
how many marks they had earned and the remainder yet to be earned
before advancement to the next class.75 At the end of each month,
officials calculated each convict’s new balance of marks and issued
new badges.76 Each class of prisoners wore different-color uniforms to
demonstrate their stage of advancement.77 According to Crofton, pris-
oners became deeply invested in the record of their achievement:
There is not an intelligent officer in the Irish Convict Department
who will not bear witness to the intense interest taken by each con-
vict in the attainment of his marks, and the jealous care with which
he notes them.78
The English Convict System adopted its own program of progres-
sive stages of confinement,79 but the two systems took opposite
stances on post-release supervision and revocation. In both England
and Ireland, the remission of a sentence through a ticket of leave
(then also called a license) was expressly conditional—at least in
theory. Stern admonitions about the government’s powers of revoca-
tion were printed on all English and Irish licenses, including the fol-
lowing warning:
To produce a forfeiture of the license it is by no means neces-
sary that the holder should be convicted of any new offence. If he
associates with notoriously bad characters, leads an idle and disso-
lute life, or has no visible means of obtaining an honest livelihood,
&c., it will be assumed that he is about to relapse into crime, and he
laborers); WALTER CROFTON, A FEW REMARKS ON “THE CONVICT QUESTION” 6 (Dublin,
William Bernard Kelly 1857) (noting running of errands outside prison under minimal
surveillance).
73 CARPENTER, supra note 55, at 8 (referencing Crofton’s description of the Irish
Convict System).
74 Id. at 22.
75 See GIBSON, supra note 24, at 18 (explaining the Irish badge system in detail).
76 CLAY, supra note 27, at 47–48.
77 GIBSON, supra note 24, at 19–20.
78 CARPENTER, supra note 55, at 10 (quoting Crofton).
79 See CLAY, supra note 27, at 56–57 (criticizing the staged incarceration program of
the English system in which prisoners were divided into classes and given benefits based on
their class).
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will be at once apprehended, and re-committed to prison under his
original sentence.80
In England, however, nothing was done to supervise ticket-of-
leave–holders. In echoes of Maconochie, Jebb believed that such sur-
veillance would make released prisoners second-class citizens and
undermine their reintegration:
To impose conditions and restrictions that would effectually
stamp them as individuals belonging to a criminal class, in this
country would be manifestly a most inexpedient exercise of power,
and one that would be calculated to defeat the entire object of an
improved system of convict discipline. . . .
. . . .
To impose police supervision over a poor wretch struggling to
find employment is the way to add to his difficulties and throw him
back into crime instead of keeping him out of it.81
In England, the police were instructed to leave licensees alone;
there was no effort to identify them to the public.82 In Jebb’s view, “a
ticket-of-leave man, as a general rule, is a proscribed man with the
public. However desirous he may be, and however hard he may strive
to regain his character, a brand has been put upon him that follows
him to his grave.”83 Jebb believed that informal, non-coercive supervi-
sion by “benevolent individuals” was the only form of supervision that
would aid in actual reintegration.84
In Ireland, by contrast, release on a ticket of leave was closely
monitored and rigorously conditional.85 In the first place, prisoners
could not receive a ticket of leave until they received an offer of
employment from someone in the community. Then, when a prisoner
accepted an offer of employment, the relevant local constabulary
added him to the registry of licensed convicts.86 This registry con-
tained detailed information about the licensee’s parentage and
80 CROFTON, supra note 60, at 11.
81 Joshua Jebb, Explanations Showing the Difficulties Which Would Attend the
Introduction into England of the Probationary Stages of Discipline and Supervision of the
Police, &c., Which Have Been Adopted in Ireland, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 402, 411, 414 (George W. Hastings
ed., London, John W. Parker, Son, and Bourne 1863).
82 CLAY, supra note 27, at 31.
83 CROFTON, NOTES, supra note 66, at 18 (quoting Jebb’s writing).
84 See id. (quoting Jebb as recommending a benevolent form of supervision for
licensees).
85 See CROFTON, supra note 60, at 11 (stating that the conditions on the Irish ticket
were strictly enforced, and describing how licensees were monitored).
86 CARPENTER, supra note 55, at 50 (quoting Walter Crofton et al., General Report of
the Directors of Convict Prisons, FOURTH ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTORS CONVICT
PRISONS IR. 1, 13 (1858) (reproducing rules for the supervision of convicts on tickets of
leave).
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circumstances, along with his photograph.87 The licensee had to report
to the local police station at the beginning of every month.88 The local
officers were instructed to inform the Inspector-General of
Constabulary of any evidence of misconduct.89
Crofton justified this kind of police supervision as the key to
overcoming stigma. Crofton believed that effective supervision and
summary revocation—as a test of the reformatory work done in
prison—would give the public (and particularly employers) the confi-
dence necessary to accept convicts back into the community.90
Everyone knew that swift punishment would follow a failure to abide
by the conditions.91 Tickets were revoked for infractions such as irreg-
ular reporting, loss of employment through drink, and brawling in
public.92
Irish prison officials, meanwhile, became invested in helping pris-
oners secure the employment necessary for tickets of leave. Many of
those eligible for early release could not find employment without
assistance. A prison lecturer who worked for Crofton traveled to sur-
rounding mills, factories, and farms, seeking to persuade employers to
hire his men.93 Finding jobs was very difficult at the beginning until a
core group of employers had been recruited.94 But reintegration
87 See CLAY, supra note 27, at 54 (noting that Crofton’s registry is “of [the same] kind”
as one that requires a “history of his birth, parentage, and previous life” as well as a photo-
graphed “portrait”).
88 CROFTON, CONVICT SYSTEMS, supra note 60, at 11.
89 See CARPENTER, supra note 55, at 50 (reproducing rules requiring a police report if a
licensee was observed “guilty of misconduct or leading an irregular life” (quoting Crofton
et al., supra note 86)). Not all convicts were under police supervision. The prison lecturer
supervised ticket-of-leave–holders in Dublin through bi-monthly visits. See CARPENTER,
supra note 55, at 53–54 (quoting 2 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO
INQUIRE INTO THE OPERATION OF THE ACTS RELATING TO TRANSPORTATION AND PENAL
SERVITUDE 392 (London, George E. Eyre and William Spottiswoode 1863)); GIBSON,
supra note 24, at 42 (noting that the lecturer, rather than the police, supervised the dis-
charged convicts in Dublin).
90 See CARPENTER, supra note 55, at 61, 65 (discussing evidence presented by Crofton
noting that the employers preferred the system and would not employ licensees without it)
(quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra note 89, at 275, 279); CROFTON, supra
note 66, at 20–21 (noting that employers in Ireland consider supervised convicts well pre-
pared for release and less of a danger to the public).
91 See CARPENTER, supra note 55, at 65 (listing a need to “ensure certainty both in the
minds of the convicts and of the public that all violation of the conditions of the license will
involve return to punishment” for an effective ticket-of-leave system).
92 See Walter Crofton, Memoranda Relative to the Intermediate Convict Prisons in
Ireland, 4 ANN. REP. DIRECTORS CONVICT PRISONS IR. 25, 30 (1858).
93 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra note 89, at 372–73.
94 See CARPENTER, supra note 55, at 53 (discussing the lecturer’s account of employers’
initial reluctance to employ licensees (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra
note 89, at 373)).
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through reemployment was the motivating principle behind Crofton’s
ticket-of-leave system.95
II
THE U.S. ADOPTION OF INDETERMINACY AND
CONDITIONAL RELEASE
A. The Influence of Maconochie and Crofton
The penologists who brought indeterminacy and conditional
release into American sentencing were part of a self-conscious reform
movement that was based largely on the writings of Maconochie and
Crofton.96 The first U.S. effort to combine indeterminacy with condi-
tional release was called “parole” and introduced at the Elmira
Reformatory in New York in 1877.97 Indeterminate sentencing and
conditional release quickly became the dominant sentencing structure
in the United States, with every state and the federal government
adopting a parole release system.98 For approximately one hundred
years thereafter, rehabilitation would take the place of retribution as
the central purpose of U.S. sentencing policy.99
The Prison Association of New York (NYPA), a group that rose
to national and international prominence in the 1860s and 1870s, was
the driving force behind the American parole movement. Dr. Enoch
Cobb Wines, an internationally renowned penologist who served as
the NYPA’s corresponding secretary, organized the celebrated inau-
gural Congress of the National Prison Association (NPA) in 1870.100
At this Congress, the NPA adopted its “Declaration of Principles.”101
This declaration, the charter for indeterminate sentencing in the
United States, drew extensively on the principles of Maconochie and
Crofton. The NYPA was also behind the establishment of the Elmira
Reformatory.
95 See CLAY, supra note 27, at 51–53 (arguing that Crofton’s system was designed to
convince prospective employers to give licensees a chance).
96 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 17 (“The main arguments of early
proponents of the indeterminate sentence in America were based upon the works of
Maconochie and Crofton.”).
97 See Edward Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole
System, 16 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 21–23 (1925) (enumerating and
explaining the key provisions utilized at Elmira).
98 Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV.
702, 702 (1963) (noting that “[e]very state in the Union maintains some form of parole
system . . .” (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 7 (1939)).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978) (noting a century-old shift
in the primary purpose of sentencing in the United States, from retribution to a more
rehabilitative model).
100 See Lindsey, supra note 97, at 18 (discussing Wines’s role).
101 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Between 1865 and 1870, the influential annual reports of the
NYPA included many descriptions of the work of Maconochie and
Crofton. The 1865 report, for example, included an account by Wines
of Maconochie’s mark system and the “wonderful success” achieved
at Norfolk Island.102 In 1866, Gaylord B. Hubbell, a member of the
NYPA Executive Committee, traveled to Ireland to observe Crofton’s
system firsthand. Hubbell, who had served as the warden of Sing Sing
Prison between 1862 and 1864, prepared an account of his experiences
for the 1867 annual report.103
In the report, Hubbell described his visit to the Irish prisons as
“like finding, in the midst of a dreary desert, some beautiful oasis
. . . .”104 In particular, Hubbell approved of the meaningful incentives
afforded prisoners. The quasi-freedom of the intermediate prisons
could be earned in four years of a seven-year sentence.105 He consid-
ered the ticket of leave the “most critical” step in the system: The
strict enforcement of conditions provided a real-world test of the
reform program practiced in the prison.106 According to Hubbell,
after an initial period of hostility from the Irish public, there was now
a waiting list to employ those on tickets of leave.107 Based on his
experiences, Hubbell called for an immediate trial of the Irish system
in New York.108
In 1867, Wines and Theodore Dwight, the NYPA’s president, sub-
mitted a report to the New York legislature that would eventually lead
to the establishment of the Elmira Reformatory.109 They called for the
legislature to adopt “reformation sentences” and abandon the practice
of “time sentences.”110 To do so, according to Wines and Dwight, the
legislature should adopt the Irish model, the “best model” of which
they had any knowledge.111 The goal of the new system would be
102 E.C. Wines, The Progress of Prison Reform in England, 20 ANN. REP. EXEC. COMM.
PRISON ASS’N N.Y. 67, 92–93 (1865).
103 G.B. Hubbell, Report on the Prisons of England and Ireland, in 22 ANN. REP. EXEC.
COMM. PRISON ASS’N N.Y. 95, 147–76 (1867).
104 Id. at 147.
105 Id. at 181.
106 Id. at 175.
107 See id. at 175–76 (describing how the licensees won over employers with their faith-
fulness and industriousness).
108 Id. at 188–91 (describing in some detail features of the envisioned system).
109 E.C. WINES & THEODORE W. DWIGHT, REPORT ON THE PRISONS AND
REFORMATORIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA MADE TO THE LEGISLATURE OF
NEW YORK, JANUARY, 1867 (Albany, Van Benthuysen & Sons 1867).
110 Id. at 275.
111 Id. at 72.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-3\NYU303.txt unknown Seq: 21 13-MAY-13 13:32
978 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:958
reformation by “placing the prisoner’s fate, as far as possible, in his
own hands . . . .”112
In 1868, the NYPA recommended that the New York legislature
open a new prison to test the Irish system on a small scale. In 1870, the
legislature responded and approved an act to establish this new
reformatory in the city of Elmira.113 This reformatory opened its
doors in 1876.114
Meanwhile, the 1870 NPA Congress prominently featured the
ideas of Maconochie and Crofton. Delegates from twenty-five states
and two foreign countries attended this week-long conference in
Cincinnati. The aim of the conference was to create a system that
would work “reformation in the soul” of each prisoner, and would
“restore him to society regenerated and reformed.”115 According to
Wines, the central ideas of Maconochie and Crofton (although not yet
put into practice) already were accepted by the time of the Congress:
The principle of rewards, as an incitement to good conduct and
reformation, is one on which there is now little dissent. There is also
a very general agreement that such rewards should consist of, (1) a
diminution of sentence; (2) a share in the earnings; (3) a gradual
withdrawal of restraint; and (4) a gradual enlargement of
privilege.116
Franklin Sanborn, a founding member of the NPA and former
Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of State Charities, delivered a
paper on how the Irish Convict System could be adopted into the
United States.117 In Sanborn’s view, most of the system could be
implemented without controversy. He concluded that the use of an
exact mark system was particularly indispensible, although it required
“perfect honesty and impartiality on the part of the prison officers.”118
Only the ticket of leave proved divisive, provoking “innumerable
112 Id. at 73.
113 Lindsey, supra note 97, at 17.
114 Id. at 21.
115 A.T. Goshorn, Opening Address, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS
ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 1, 2 (E.C. Wines ed., Albany, The
Argus Company 1871).
116 E.C. Wines, The Present Outlook of Prison Discipline in the United States, in
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY
DISCIPLINE, 15, 19 (E.C. Wines ed., Albany, The Argus Company 1871). Although Crofton
could not attend, he contributed a paper on the Irish system. Crofton, supra note 59.
117 F.B. Sanborn, How Far Is the Irish Prison System Applicable to American Prisons?,
in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY
DISCIPLINE 406 (E.C. Wines ed., Albany, The Argus Company 1871). As a result of the
1870 Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline, the National Prison
Association was founded; the Congress was renamed accordingly.
118 See id. at 407 (arguing for the introduction of the mark system into the United
States).
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objections” to its domestic implementation.119 According to Sanborn,
the public “shudder[ed]” at the idea that a convict “who may have
committed heinous offenses, and who may be likely to repeat them”
would be “let[ ] loose upon the community before his original
sentence ha[d] fully expired . . . .”120 With respect to the ticket of leave
(i.e. conditional release), some objected that “this sort of betwixt-and-
between condition, neither confinement nor liberty,” was “contrary to
our American notions . . . .”121 Others raised concerns that police
supervision created the prospect of gross abuses of power. And many
feared that effective control over licensees would be impossible, given
the possibility for escape across state lines.122 Sanborn was confident
that all such objections could be overcome.123
The 1870 Congress culminated in the unanimous adoption of a
“Declaration of Principles.”124 Together with the founding of Elmira,
this declaration launched the indeterminate era in U.S. sentencing
practice. The Congress concluded that the “most valuable parts” of
the Irish system, from the separate penal stage to the indeterminate
establishments (i.e. without the tickets of leave), could be applied as
easily in the United States as in Ireland.125 The core philosophy, as
reflected in the principles listed in the accompanying table, was lifted
from the work of Maconochie and Crofton.
119 Id. at 410.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 411.
122 Id.
123 See id. at 407, 410–12.
124 Declaration of Principles Adopted and Promulgated by the Congress , in
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY
DISCIPLINE 541 (E.C. Wines ed., Albany, The Argus Company 1871).
125 Principles of Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline Suggested for Consideration by
the National Congress, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY
AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 548, 548, 557 (E.C. Wines ed., Albany, The Argus
Company 1871).
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TABLE 1
Selected 1870 NPA Principles Drawn from Maconochie and Crofton126
. . . .
III. The progressive classification of prisoners, based on character and worked on some well-adjusted
mark system, should be established in all prisons above the common jail.
IV. Since hope is a more potent agent than fear, it should be made an ever-present force in the minds
of prisoners, by a well-devised and skillfully-applied system of rewards for good conduct, industry and
attention to learning. Rewards, more than punishments, are essential to every good prison system.
V. The prisoner’s destiny should be placed, measurably, in his own hands; he must be put into
circumstances where he will be able, through his own exertions, to continually better his own condition.
A regulated self-interest must be brought into play, and made constantly operative.
. . . .
VIII. Preemptory sentences ought to be replaced by those of indeterminate length. Sentences limited
only by satisfactory proof of reformation should be substituted for those measured by mere lapse of
time.
. . . .
XII. A system of prison discipline, to be truly reformatory, must gain the will of the convict. . . .
XIV. The prisoner’s self-respect should be cultivated to the utmost, and every effort made to give
back to him his manhood. There is no greater mistake in the whole compass of penal discipline, than its
studied imposition of degradation as a part of punishment. . . .
The 1870 principles would prove deeply influential during the
“reformatory” era, when indeterminate sentencing was first imple-
mented in the United States. Over the ensuing decades, however,
adherence to the principles would decline sharply. As I shall describe
below, the extent of that decline would be reflected in the mode of
indeterminacy introduced into federal sentencing law in 1910.127
B. The Elmira Reformatory Model
Zebulon Brockway, one of the organizers of the NPA Congress,
was a defining force in bringing Irish-style indeterminate sentencing
and conditional release into the United States.128 Brockway was the
first superintendent of the Elmira Reformatory and served in that
capacity for nearly twenty-five years, from 1876 to 1900.129 Working
from the 1870 NPA principles, Brockway developed a reform program
for Elmira that became a model for many other states.130
In 1877, for example, Brockway secured the passage of an inde-
terminate sentencing statute for Elmira that implemented key fea-
tures of Maconochie’s mark system.131 Through the accumulation of
126 Id.
127 See infra Part II.C.
128 Some degree of indeterminacy was being introduced around the country through the
adoption of good-time laws. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 15 (describing early
good-time laws in the United States).
129 ZEBULON BROCKWAY, FIFTY YEARS OF PRISON SERVICE 161, 165 (1912).
130 Lindsey, supra note 97, at 30–40. But see ALEXANDER W. PISCIOTTA, BENEVOLENT
REPRESSION: SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE AMERICAN REFORMATORY-PRISON MOVEMENT
33–34 (1994) (claiming that Brockway resorted to frequent physical violence and was not
the benevolent figure often portrayed).
131 Lindsey, supra note 97, at 21.
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marks, prisoners could secure increased privileges and earlier release.
Marks were to be awarded for “good personal demeanor, diligence in
labor and study, and for results accomplished . . . .”132 Prisoners would
forfeit marks if found guilty of derelictions or offenses.133 As in
Ireland, and as recommended by Maconochie, prison managers had to
update prisoners regularly on their tallies of marks. By statute, these
updates were to occur once a month, or more frequently if
requested.134
Reminiscent of Maconochie and Crofton, Brockway also imple-
mented a progressive classification system at Elmira.135 Before
entering this system, which consisted of three grades, prisoners were
placed in a cell for one or two days to allow time for “contempla-
tion.”136 New prisoners then entered the second (or intermediate)
grade. As in the Irish system, they could earn up to nine marks a
month: three for school progress, three for labor, and three for
demeanor.137 By earning sufficient marks, they were promoted to the
first grade, where they received privileges such as better food and
greater access to the library. For offenses such as deceitfulness, vio-
lence, or continued disregard of prison rules, they were demoted to
the third grade, where they wore distinctive red uniforms and were
denied visitors and other privileges.138
Despite the unease expressed at the 1870 Congress, Elmira’s gov-
erning statute provided for the possibility of early conditional release
on parole,139 an adaptation of the Irish ticket of leave. Elmira’s board
of managers had full discretion to establish rules and regulations for
paroling convicts outside the institution. While on parole, the convict
would remain under the board’s custody and control and could be
supervised by “suitable persons,” appointed by the board. The board
could “retake and reimprison” any paroled convict upon a written
order certified by its secretary.140
132 Act of Apr. 24, 1877, ch. 173, § 8, 1877 N.Y. Laws 186, 188.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See ALEXANDER WINTER, THE NEW YORK STATE REFORMATORY IN ELMIRA 25–41
(London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1891) (explaining in detail the mechanics and philos-
ophy of Elmira’s classification system).
136 Id. at 16.
137 Id. at 28–29.
138 See id. at 50–56 (describing the differences between the three grades).
139 The word “parole” comes from the French parole d’honneur (word of honor). Dr. S.
G. Howe of Boston first used this word to describe early conditional release from prison in
an 1846 letter to the Prison Association of New York. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note
23, at 4–5 (citing PHILIP KLEIN, PRISON METHODS IN NEW YORK STATE 417 (1920)).
140 Act of Apr. 24, 1877, ch. 173, §§ 5, 10, 1877 N.Y. Laws 186, 187, 189.
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Under Brockway’s system, a prisoner could earn release on
parole in as little as a year without regard to the length of the under-
lying sentence. Ultimately, all but ten percent earned release within
three years.141 Compared to Ireland, where tickets of leave were
reserved for the very top inmates, parole at Elmira was much more
widespread.
As in Ireland, employment was seen as the key to reintegration.
Prison officials granted conditional release on parole only if the pris-
oner had secured prearranged employment.142 If the prisoner could
not find employment on his own, the prison managers found him a job
based on the training he had received in prison.143 Those who lost
their jobs through misfortune could return to the reformatory as
“guests,” and a new position was found for them as quickly as
possible. Those who lost their jobs through their own fault (but not
through criminal conduct) and voluntarily returned on “request or
order” were placed in an abbreviated version of the program. Those
who violated their parole by crime or by “gross improprieties” were
returned to either the second or third grade, as determined by the
institution.144
Elmira prisoners generally were paroled for six months, followed
by complete liberation.145 In Brockway’s view, a term longer than six
months “would be discouraging to the average paroled man, and a
shorter term insufficiently steadying.”146 During the parole period,
convicts had to submit monthly reports, certified by a reliable person
such as a clergyman or an employer. They were supervised by a prison
“Transfer Officer,” rather than the local police.147 According to
Brockway, approximately eighty-two percent of parolees adjusted suc-
cessfully and did not return to crime.148
Based on the success achieved at Elmira, a reformatory move-
ment swept through the United States. By 1901, twelve states had
established reformatories built on the Elmira model.149 The reforma-
tory era, which peaked between 1870 and 1900, was characterized by
141 WINTER, supra note 135, at 27–28 (supplying a numerical breakdown of prison terms
served until release).
142 Id. at 34–35 (stating that a position of employment was secured for every Elmira
prisoner released on parole).
143 Id. at 35; BROCKWAY, supra note 129 at 324–25.
144 See WINTER, supra note 135, at 42 (describing the rules at Elmira for dealing with
unsuccessful parolees).
145 Id. at 41.
146 BROCKWAY, supra note 129, at 324.
147 WINTER, supra note 135, at 41.
148 BROCKWAY, supra note 129, at 325.
149 5 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES: PRISONS 23 (1940).
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two central themes: (1) indeterminate sentencing and conditional
release; and (2) the use of marks or some other system of earned posi-
tive rewards.150 Indeterminate sentencing and conditional release
would expand beyond this era. The mark system would not—despite
its anchoring role in indeterminacy theory, as adopted by the 1870
Congress.
In 1940, the Department of Justice explained that the mark
system failed because it was too difficult for ordinary prison officers to
implement. The success of the reformatory program depended on the
quality of the prison leadership and staff. Failing to recognize this,
states continued to assign to reformatories “the same type of per-
sonnel that had been assigned to prisons plus a few underpaid and
over-worked ‘instructors.’”151 As a result:
The grading system also was too complicated for this type of
staff to maintain, changing as it did with each new political
administration. The tendency was to put every one who behaved
himself into the first grade leaving only a few in the second grade
and those actually under punishment in the third grade. The old
“prison discipline” which placed the emphasis on being a “good
prisoner” regardless of anything more fundamental, such as
achievement in school or shop or character, was dominant still.152
Parole and indeterminate sentencing (without marks), by con-
trast, quickly spread beyond the reformatory model. By 1898, at least
twenty states had adopted parole laws.153 By the 1950s, every state in
the Union, along with the federal government, had incorporated inde-
terminate sentencing and parole release into its core criminal justice
policy.154 These laws, like the system in place at Elmira, generally pro-
vided for indeterminate sentencing capped by a statutory maximum
tailored to the offense.155 Some state statutes mandated a minimum
period of incarceration before a person could be considered for
parole.156 The first federal parole statute, adopted in 1910, included
both of these features.157
150 See id. at 22–23 (noting these features of the reformatory era).
151 Id. at 24.
152 Id. at 25.
153 See AM. BAR ASS’N, Report of the Committee on Parole and Indeterminate Sentences
of Prisoners, 21 ANN. REP. AM. BAR ASS’N 466, 468 (1898) (listing states).
154 Note, supra note 98, at 702 (noting the presence of a parole system in every state).
155 U.N. DEP’T OF SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 7, at 71.
156 See id. at 72 chart 1 (listing minimums and maximums by state).
157 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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C. The Emergence of Federal Parole and Federal Probation
In this Section, I describe the enactment and evolution of federal
parole. I also briefly note the passage in 1925 of the first federal pro-
bation statute. I do so because a description of probation’s basic struc-
ture will become important to understanding the evolution of
supervised release. Because federal probation is a strict alternative to
incarceration, however, it is not a form of indeterminate sentencing, as
discussed in this Article.158
On June 25, 1910, Congress enacted a parole statute for prisoners
housed in federal institutions. The new statute applied only to those
confined for a definite term of more than a year, whose record of con-
duct demonstrated that they had obeyed the rules of the institution,
and who had served at least one-third of their sentences.159
The debate over passage of the bill reveals mainly practical con-
cerns. Officials wanted to increase uniformity between federal pris-
oners housed in federal facilities and those housed in state facilities.
Federal prisoners in state facilities were already subject to local parole
laws, while those in federal facilities had no access to parole at all.160
Members of Congress also emphasized the potential cost-savings: The
federal government would save one hundred dollars per year for each
prisoner released on parole.161 The availability of parole would also
ease the pressure on the overcrowded federal penitentiaries.162
Much less emphasis was placed on the reformatory purposes of
parole. Representative Henry D. Clayton, the ranking member of the
House Judiciary Committee and a former U.S. Attorney from
Alabama, introduced the parole bill in the House. In so doing, he
raised the goal of reform, but only in the most abstract terms:
Mr. Speaker, after more than ten years of service in this House
I am prepared to say that this bill is the most humane measure ever
presented to Congress during that period. It is in the interest of
humanity. It seeks to extend clemency and mercy to those deserving
clemency and mercy. It is in accordance with the enlightened senti-
ment of the day, the progressive spirit of the times, and in harmony
with the philanthropy of the day and age, that would aid suffering
158 A complete account of federal probation, accordingly, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
159 Parole Act, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819 (1910), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742
(2006)). See Part III.B for a discussion of how parole was repealed by the Sentencing
Reform Act.
160 PAUL W. KEVE, PRISONS AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF U.S.
FEDERAL CORRECTIONS 65 (1991).
161 H.R. REP. NO. 61-1341, at 6 (1910).
162 KEVE, supra note 160, at 65.
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humanity and at the same time lend a helping hand toward the ref-
ormation of convicted criminals.163
The 1910 statute created parole boards for each of the federal
penitentiaries. Each board was composed of three members: the
Superintendent of Prisons of the Department of Justice, the warden of
the penitentiary, and the physician of the penitentiary. Each board
had the authority to parole prisoners from its own institution. Once
out on parole, prisoners remained formally in the custody of the
warden until the expiration of the term specified in their judgments,
minus any good-time deductions authorized by Congress. A parole
officer, appointed for each penitentiary, and the U.S. Marshals super-
vised the parolees.164
The statutory standards for parole release were vague. The board
had the power to parole an inmate if it appeared that “there [was] a
reasonable probability that such applicant [would] live and remain at
liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the board
such release [was] not incompatible with the welfare of society
. . . .”165 Each board could prescribe terms and conditions of parole
release as it saw fit. The statute mandated only that the board stipu-
late the “limits of the residence of the person paroled,” which it could
then amend at its discretion.166
The statutory revocation powers were equally hazy. If a member
of the parole board had “reliable information” that a prisoner had
violated his parole, the warden could issue a warrant for the
“retaking” of the prisoner.167 The prisoner would then be given an
opportunity to appear before the board of parole, which had full dis-
cretion to revoke the parole or amend the conditions.168 If the board
revoked the parole, the prisoner had to serve out the remainder of the
sentence without credit for the time spent on parole.169
Some expressed concern during the House debate about the
breadth of the discretion afforded to federal parole boards.
Representative Adolph Sabath opposed the bill on the grounds that it
favored those with social and political influence over the poor who
had no influence.170 In response, Clayton stressed that the proposed
163 45 CONG. REC. H6374 (daily ed. May 16, 1910) (statement of Rep. Clayton).
164 Parole Act §§ 2–3, 7.
165 Id. § 3.
166 Id.
167 Id. § 4.
168 Id. § 6.
169 Id.
170 45 CONG. REC. H6375–76 (daily ed. May 16, 1910) (statement of Rep. Sabath).
Sabath immigrated to the United States from Bohemia (now the Czech Republic) in 1881
as a penniless teenager, which may have influenced his position. JOINT COMM. ON
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statute was a “philanthropic law” with “nothing suggestive of rich or
poor or class or race in it.”171 Clayton denounced Sabath’s concern as
insulting to the integrity of the board: “Surely this House does not
believe, as the gentleman from Illinois seems to believe, with his per-
fervid imagination, that the parole board will unjustly turn out the rich
and let the poor, deserving of kindly consideration, unduly be
punished.”172
In September 1910, the Department of Justice promulgated regu-
lations for its parole boards.173 Under these regulations, the boards
would only consider prisoners for parole if they had been in the
highest grade of conduct for the six months preceding the application;
this was soon transformed into a requirement that the applicant had
obeyed the rules of the institution.174 Applicants had to secure a “first
friend or adviser,” who would agree to employ them directly or try to
find employment for them while on parole.175 The rules on employ-
ment could be suspended if the board did not believe that the parole
applicant was fit for employment or if there were other reasons that
employment did not seem necessary.176
In 1925, fifteen years after adopting federal parole, Congress
enacted a federal probation statute.177 Probation provided for a
period of community supervision as a conditional alternative to incar-
ceration, rather than as a conditional release mechanism from incar-
ceration. The original goal of probation was to “alleviat[e] the
harshness of punishment” by “preventing contamination of the crim-
inal novice in the unsavory atmosphere of the prison.”178 Accordingly,
the 1925 probation statute empowered federal judges to suspend the
execution of the prison sentence in order to provide a conditional
opportunity to avoid prison through good behavior.179 As explained
by Chief Justice William Howard Taft in 1928, probation ameliorated
PRINTING, 83D CONG., MEMORIAL SERVICES HELD IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH REMARKS PRESENTED IN EULOGY OF ADOLPH
JOACHIM SABATH 5, 31 (1953).
171 45 CONG. REC. H6376 (daily ed. May 16, 1910) (statement of Rep. Clayton).
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE
PAROLING OF UNITED STATES PRISONERS 21–22 (1910) (establishing regulations for a
parole board at Leavenworth penitentiary).
174 Id. at 22; see also PETER B. HOFFMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 7 (2003).
175 HOFFMAN, supra note 174, at 7.
176 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 173, at 35 (establishing regulations for a
parole board at McNeil Island, Washington).
177 Federal Probation Act, Pub. L. No. 68-596, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259 (1925).
178 2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES: PROBATION, at vii (1939).
179 Federal Probation Act § 1.
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the sentence by “delaying actual execution or providing a suspension
so that the stigma might be withheld and an opportunity for reform
and repentance be granted before actual imprisonment should stain
the life of the convict.”180
D. Indeterminacy Under Federal Parole
The 1910 parole law established a form of federal indeterminate
sentencing with conditional release. Indeterminacy under this parole
law involved all three branches of government: Congress set the max-
imum for the offense, the judge imposed a sentence within the statu-
tory range, and the executive’s parole authorities decided the actual
duration of the imprisonment.181 Little about the new federal parole
system as implemented, however, accorded with the ideas of
Maconochie or Crofton, which originally had inspired the American
parole movement.
For instance, Maconochie would have been horrified at the kind
of arbitrary power awarded to parole authorities such as the federal
parole board.182 Maconochie thought that the key to reform was
placing prisoners in control of their own destinies. Through the mark
system, he sought to limit official discretion to the greatest extent pos-
sible and to make the release process transparent for prisoners.
Maconochie would not “have cared for a system where the time of
release depends, not on a prisoner’s own efforts, but on a tribunal’s
estimate of the significance of those efforts, and of various other con-
siderations which may not be known or disclosed to him.”183
Maconochie also would have opposed the sweeping revocation
powers afforded the parole boards, particularly over conditions that
invited broad discretionary judgments. Federal parolees, for example,
had to conduct themselves “honorably” and refrain from associating
with those of “bad reputation.”184
The form of conditional release built into federal parole, mean-
while, left behind many of the principles of the Irish system, which
also had been implemented at Elmira. For Crofton, conditional
release was a means of publicly testing, and showing confidence in, the
reformatory program of the prison. The ticket of leave was granted as
180 Cook v. United States, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928).
181 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1989).
182 John Vincent Barry, Pioneers in Criminology: XII. Alexander Maconochie
(1787–1860), 47 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 145, 159 (1956) (arguing that
Maconochie was “a firm believer in the rights of the individual” and would have objected
to the kinds of “arbitrary powers entrusted” to parole boards).
183 Id. at 160.
184 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 173, at 14.
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a public symbol of the trust that the prisoner had now earned. In addi-
tion, under both the Irish and Elmira systems, only those who had
secured employment could be released on tickets of leave. Prison offi-
cials worked to find employment for releasees based on the practical
skills they had developed in prison. By contrast, employment was not
a prerequisite to release under the federal parole system, diluting the
administrative incentive to train prisoners and recruit and win over
potential employers.
Over the next several decades, the federal parole system became
ever more removed from prisoners’ daily lives, moving further away
from the philosophy of Maconochie and Crofton. In 1930, a single
parole board, the United States Board of Parole in Washington, D.C.,
replaced the institutional parole boards.185 Over time, the members of
the parole board had less and less direct contact with prisoners. The
board appointed its first non-board member “hearing examiner” in
1939.186 By 1971, hearing examiners were conducting approximately
two-thirds of all hearings to give the then–five-member board more
time to review files and vote on cases.187 In general, decisions were
made by a concurrence of two board members. A prisoner’s file would
be circulated among the board members at the D.C. office until two of
the voters concurred.188
For many decades, federal courts did not oversee decisions to
grant or revoke parole. Judges routinely denied challenges to the
parole system raised through petitions for habeas corpus and actions
for declaratory and injunctive relief, citing a variety of rationales.189
First, parole (like probation) was considered a matter of grace, rather
than a right, and therefore was not subject to adjudication.190 Second,
as the Supreme Court emphasized in a 1923 case, Anderson v. Corall,
parolees remained in the legal custody and control of the warden:
While parole was “an amelioration of punishment, it [was] in legal
effect imprisonment.”191 Third, courts concluded that criminals had
“exhausted” their rights until their prison sentences expired: Because
prisoners had received full protections in the underlying prosecution,
185 HOFFMAN, supra note 174, at 7.
186 Id. at 10.
187 Id. at 18.
188 Id.
189 For an example of one such rationale, see Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 45 (5th
Cir. 1949), which emphasizes that the federal parole statutes “bristle with discretion given
the Board, and are silent about court interference.”
190 See, e.g., Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GEO. L.J. 705, 706 (1968)
(describing parole as a “legislative act of grace”); Note, supra note 98, at 704 (describing
this school of thought as the “grace theory”).
191 Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S 193, 196 (1923).
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these protections did not extend to the “later enforcement of punish-
ment already validly imposed.”192 Fourth, parolees had accepted
parole release as a contract and were therefore obligated by its terms.
Fifth, courts viewed parole boards as acting in the role of parens
patriae: The objectives of the board and the inmate were not adverse,
obviating the need for due process protections.193 On the basis of
these theories, courts for many years did not recognize any legally
protectable interest held by parolees in their status.
Eventually some courts—most notably the D.C. Circuit—began
insisting on certain small procedural protections for parolees, but the
basic understanding of parolees’ status remained unchanged. In 1961,
over the opposition of the U.S. Parole Board, the D.C. Circuit held
that parolees had the right to retain counsel for parole revocation
hearings and could present voluntary witnesses on their own behalf.194
Two years later, however, the D.C. Circuit held that revocation pro-
ceedings did not trigger Sixth Amendment rights, including the right
to appointed counsel and the right to the confrontation of witnesses,
by invoking the parens patriae principle: “In a real sense the Parole
Board in revoking parole occupies the role of parent withdrawing a
privilege from an errant child not as punishment but for misuse of the
privilege.”195
In 1972, the Supreme Court held in Morrissey v. Brewer that
parole authorities had to provide some summary due process protec-
tions during revocation proceedings.196 In so holding, the Court
emphasized that parole revocation was not a stage in the criminal
prosecution, which would necessitate the full complement of proce-
dural rights. To the contrary, the state had an “overwhelming interest”
in being able to reimprison a parolee without the “burden of a new
adversary criminal trial . . . .”197 Nevertheless, the parolee had
192 Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 286 (1971) (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 946 n.5 (8th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
193 Comment, supra note 192, at 288–89 (citing Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407
(2d Cir. 1970)); see also Comment, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing
Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 843 (1975) (explaining parens patriae as a traditional judicial
approach to parole hearings).
194 See, e.g., Reed v. Butterworth, 297 F.2d 776, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (directing the U.S.
Parole Board to allow the prisoner to call voluntary witnesses for a parole revocation
hearing); Glenn v. Reed, 289 F.2d 462, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (finding a prisoner’s hearing
and revocation was invalid because he “neither had nor was offered counsel” at the parole
revocation hearing).
195 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
196 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). This decision followed in the wake of a
1970 Supreme Court decision that held that whether the state was revoking a “right”—as
opposed to a privilege—had no bearing on the requirements of the revocation hearing.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
197 Id. at 483.
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received an “implicit promise” that parole would not be revoked
absent a violation of the conditions of release, requiring that at least
some process be implemented.198
Accordingly, the Court held that due process required a system of
informal hearings for parole revocation. Shortly after a parolee was
arrested and detained, an impartial administrator would decide in a
preliminary hearing whether there was probable cause or reasonable
ground to believe that the parolee had violated the conditions of his
or her parole. The retaken parolee was then entitled to a revocation
hearing, during which the parole board would decide whether revoca-
tion was warranted. The parolee had a few basic rights at that hearing:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure
. . . of evidence . . . ; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present . . . evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witness (unless the hearing officer . . . f[ound] good cause
for not allowing confrontation[ ]); (e) a “neutral and detached”
hearing body such as a traditional parole board . . . ; and (f) a
written statement . . . as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole.199
The rights adopted in Morrissey did not include the presumption
of innocence or a requirement that a parole violation be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.200 There was no right to a jury determina-
tion, no compulsory process, no exclusionary rule requirement, and no
double jeopardy protection.201 A 1973 Supreme Court case, which
applied Morrissey to the probation system, confirmed that individuals
lacked a constitutional right to appointed (as opposed to retained)
counsel for either parole or probation revocation proceedings.202 As
described in Part IV, the precedent on parole and probation revoca-
tion would later be applied incongruously to supervised release.203
198 Id. at 482.
199 Id. at 488–89.
200 Id.
201 Id.; see also, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363–64 (1998)
(emphasizing that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply outside of criminal trials);
United States v. Hanahan, 798 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that double jeopardy
protections are not triggered by revocation of parole); Whitehead v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,
755 F.2d 1536, 1537 (11th Cir. 1980) (noting that the preponderance of evidence standard,
rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, applies to parole revocation proceedings);
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (not requiring compulsory process for
parole revocation).
202 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 778, 790 (1973) (giving a state discretion to
appoint counsel on a case-by-case basis).
203 The Morrissey standards on parole and probation revocation were later grafted onto
supervised release, even though supervised release follows the completion of the full
prison term imposed at judgment. Whereas diluted procedural protections may have been
appropriate when a prisoner only serves a part of his prison term, as in a system of early
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III
THE U.S. DETERMINACY MOVEMENT
In the end, federal parole did not last. Congress abolished the
parole system prospectively in 1984. At the time, federal parole had
been in operation for nearly seventy-five years.
Criticisms of indeterminate sentencing had been gaining ground
since the 1960s, at both the federal and state levels.204 As discussed
below, a stream of mostly liberal scholars attacked the broad discre-
tionary powers granted to parole boards and the resulting uncertainty
and lack of transparency for prisoners. A growing consensus emerged
that a system premised on coercive rehabilitation was fatally flawed—
and that parole discretion worked against minorities and the poor.
Meanwhile, a rising tide of crime-control sentiment in the 1970s
helped energize conservative theorists around the idea of ending
parole. These critics of parole, who viewed indeterminacy through a
law-and-order lens, framed parole as the practice of indulging
criminals by granting them early release from prison.205 Although the
justifications were different, a consensus formed, as all sides
denounced parole release and indeterminate sentencing.
A. Criticisms of Parole and Coercive Rehabilitation
Notable early criticism of federal parole came from Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis, a leading administrative law scholar. In 1969,
Davis published Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, which
urged legislators to exert more control over administrative agen-
cies.206 Davis’s book held out the United States Board of Parole as an
“outstanding example of completely unstructured discretionary
power.”207 Davis eviscerated the Board for its secrecy and capricious
procedures.208 Because of the closed system of individual voting, typi-
fied by a lack of consultation among its members, even the Board
could not explain why any particular person was denied or granted
conditional release, they are not appropriate when a released prisoner has served his full
term, as in the system of supervised release. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
204 See generally KATE STITH & JOSE´ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 29–37 (1998) (summarizing criticisms of indetermi-
nate sentencing).
205 Id. at 31; cf. Willard Gaylin & David J. Rothman, Introduction to ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS at xxi, xxxvii (1976) (describing
conservatives and liberals joining in a critique of the parole system, albeit for different
reasons).
206 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
207 Id. at 126.
208 Id.
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parole. Prisoners and the public were left to guess at the reasons, cre-
ating a deep mistrust of the system.
In 1971, a widely cited report by the American Friends Service
Committee went further, attacking the very concept of using rehabili-
tative needs as a standard for determining how long to imprison
people.209 The report, prepared by a panel of seventeen criminal jus-
tice scholars, questioned the effectiveness of coercive treatment and
criticized as self-deceptive the belief that providing such treatment
somehow lessened the sting of incarceration. The authors worried that
the discretion exercised by parole boards and parole officers, osten-
sibly for the purposes of rehabilitation, was really a method of
keeping the “powerless in line.”210 The report denounced the
uncertainties inherent in indefinite sentencing as an “exquisite form[ ]
of torture”211 and “one of the most painful aspects of prison life.”212
In 1973, Judge Marvin E. Frankel published Criminal Sentences:
Law Without Order, a book that had a deep impact on federal sen-
tencing reform—in part because of the status of its author.213 Judge
Frankel, a federal judge in the Southern District of New York, assailed
the broad sentencing powers given to judges like himself. Although
Judge Frankel’s book is best known for its attack on disparity in fed-
eral sentencing, he dismissed indeterminacy and parole in equally
stark language.214 By indeterminacy, he meant “any prison sentence
for which the precise term of confinement is not known on the day of
judgment but will be subject within a substantial range to the later
decision of a parole board or some comparable agency under
whatever name.”215 For Judge Frankel, the vagueness and uncertainty
created by indeterminate sentencing were “prima facie evils,” at odds
with the certainty and predictability that we otherwise value in the
law.216
Echoing concerns about the efficacy of coercive rehabilitation,
Judge Frankel concluded that rehabilitation, that great justifier of
indeterminacy, was simply not possible in most cases.217 He rejected
209 AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 27 (1971) (lamenting that the American system follows the logic
“[l]et the punishment fit the criminal, not the crime”).
210 See id. at 28 (criticizing the opaque parole release process).
211 Id. at 29.
212 Id. at 93.
213 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
214 Id. at 86–102 (discussing indeterminate sentences); STITH & CABRANES, supra note
204, at 35–36 (discussing Judge Frankel’s role in sentencing reform).
215 FRANKEL, supra note 213, at 86.
216 Id. at 88, 96–97.
217 Id. at 96–98.
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the medicalized understanding of rehabilitation that had come to
dominate American penology by the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury.218 The typical offender was not sick with any identifiable dis-
order or diagnosable in a way that anyone knew how to cure. Judge
Frankel proposed setting the presumption in favor of the definite sen-
tence, “known and justified on the day of sentencing.”219
Efforts to reform, rather than eliminate, the federal parole system
attempted to address some of these criticisms.220 In 1972, the U.S.
Parole Board launched a pilot project to develop explicit guidelines
for parole decisionmaking and provide for appellate review within the
agency.221 In 1976, Congress adopted the Board’s reforms and
renamed the agency the United States Parole Commission.222 Under
the new statute, any decision that fell outside the parole guidelines
had to be for “good cause,” and the parolee was to receive specific
written reasons for the departure.223 The Commission was to review
any initial parole denial at regular intervals, depending on the length
of the sentence.224
But such reforms did not satisfy many critics of the rehabilitative
model, including members of an influential workshop series on federal
sentencing and parole. This series, organized by Daniel Freed and
Dennis Curtis, included Judge Frankel among its members.225 A 1977
book, which grew out of the workshop, advocated for the abolition of
parole, finding that the 1976 reorganization retained too much discre-
tion for parole authorities.226 Senator Edward Kennedy, the primary
sponsor of the SRA, wrote the foreword for the book.227
At the same time, Andrew von Hirsch, a prominent penal theo-
rist, was pushing for the return of retributive, rather than rehabilita-
tive, justice. Von Hirsch maintained that the rehabilitative model,
218 See, e.g., RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY
AND DESERT 4 (1979) (noting the prestige accorded the “medical-scientific-psychiatric
approach to crime and criminality” by the mid-1950s).
219 FRANKEL, supra note 213, at 98.
220 I should note here, however, that Congress adopted a new mandatory form of parole
for federal drug offenders in 1970. Janet Schmidt Sherman, Special Parole: Challenges to
the Imposition of Special Punishment for Drug Law Violators, 3 CRIM. JUST. J. 55, 56
(1979). This was known as “special parole.” Id. The special parole term ran consecutively
to the ordinary period of parole supervision, significantly enhancing indeterminacy for
these offenders. Id. at 56–57.
221 HOFFMAN, supra note 174, at 18.
222 Id. at 21.
223 Id. at 22.
224 Id.
225 PIERCE O’DONNELL, MICHAEL J. CHURGIN & DENNIS E. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST
AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM, at xii (1977).
226 Id. at 12–13, 69–71.
227 Id. at vii–x.
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cloaked behind a benevolent exterior, was often more intrusive and
punitive than a forthrightly penal model.228 He argued that sentencing
should be based on a fair and proportionate punishment for the crime
itself, rather than on how the punishment might influence the
offender’s future behavior.229
Von Hirsch’s “just deserts” model proved attractive across the
political spectrum.230 Conservative theorists, such as Ernest van den
Haag, also began advocating for retributively based punishment.
According to van den Haag, offenders deserved (and had effectively
volunteered to risk) whatever legislatively determined punishment
applied to their crimes.231 Accordingly, punishment should be cali-
brated based on the gravity of the act, and not on the individual quali-
ties of the offender.232
A 1974 article by New York sociologist Robert Martinson helped
solidify opposition to penal rehabilitation and the indeterminate sen-
tencing system it purportedly justified.233 This article delivered the fol-
lowing oft-quoted conclusion: “With few and isolated exceptions, the
rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no
appreciable effect on recidivism.”234 This conclusion was based on a
survey of 231 studies measuring offender rehabilitation, encompassing
both in-prison treatment programs and community-based treatment
programs for those on probation and parole.235 Martinson’s findings
received an enthusiastic airing in the press, spurring a flurry of articles
under the catchy (and memorable) banner “Nothing Works!”236
Martinson would recant the starkness of this conclusion several years
later, emphasizing that some corrective treatment programs did in fact
228 Andrew von Hirsch and Lisa Maher, Should Penal Rehabilitationism Be Revived?, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 26, 28–30 (Andrew von
Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts eds., 3d ed. 2009).
229 Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences: A Desert Perspective, in PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 115, 115–16 (Andrew von Hirsch,
Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts eds., 3d ed. 2009).
230 See LYNNE GOODSTEIN & JOHN HEPBURN, DETERMINATE SENTENCING AND
IMPRISONMENT: A FAILURE OF REFORM 25 (1985) (noting that a determinate sentencing
model was favored by both liberals and conservatives); cf. Ernest van den Haag,
Punishment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1250 (1987) (discussing von
Hirsch’s coining of the phrase “just deserts”).
231 ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND
PAINFUL QUESTION 182 (1975).
232 Id. at 186, 190.
233 Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INT. 22 (1974).
234 Id. at 25.
235 Id. at 24, 40–41.
236 Jerome Miller, Criminology: Is Rehabilitation a Waste of Time?, WASH. POST, Apr.
23, 1989, at C3.
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reduce recidivism.237 But by that time, few were listening.238 A new
orthodoxy, uniting right and left, had already formed.239
The attacks on indeterminacy and coercive rehabilitation eventu-
ally led to a dramatic restructuring of federal and state sentencing
laws. By the time the SRA was enacted in 1984, a group of ten states
had already abolished early release on parole.240 Roughly fifteen years
later, only sixteen states were using parole boards with full discre-
tionary powers.241 In a signal of the overwhelming shift in the dis-
course towards a rejection of indeterminacy, the American Bar
Association Sentencing Standards Section affirmatively recommended
determinate sentencing in 1993, after having supported indeterminate
sentencing for many years.242 It is worth emphasizing, however, that
none of the criticisms of indeterminacy were aimed at systems that
closely adhered to the principles of either Maconochie or Crofton.
B. The SRA and the End of Federal Parole
Senator Kennedy was the primary sponsor of the SRA and its
many predecessor bills in the Senate.243 In this undertaking, Kennedy
was deeply influenced by Judge Frankel, whom he called the “father
of sentencing reform.”244 The Senator’s earliest bill, introduced in
November 1975, adopted Judge Frankel’s recommendation of a sen-
tencing commission to structure judicial discretion and reduce dis-
parity among offenders.245 However, this bill (and a number of
subsequent bills) retained a basic system of parole and indeterminate
sentencing. Nearly five years later, Senator Kennedy introduced a bill
that proposed the end of parole, as recommended by Judge Frankel,
237 Rick Sarre, Beyond ‘What Works?’: A 25-Year Jubilee Retrospective of Robert
Martinson’s Famous Article, 34 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 38, 41 (2001).
238 Id.
239 Id. at 39–41.
240 Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Determinate Sentencing and Abolishing
Parole: The Long-Term Impacts on Prisons and Crime, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 108 (1996).
241 JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 65–67 (2003) (printing a table with the status of state and federal parole statutes
as of 2002).
242 Kevin R. Reitz & Curtis R. Reitz, The American Bar Association’s New Sentencing
Standards, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 169, 170 (1993).
243 For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the SRA and its predecessor
bills, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 204, at 38–43; Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 223 (1993).
244 128 CONG. REC. 26,503 (1982); Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Commentary—The
Federal Criminal Code Reform Act and New Sentencing Alternatives, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
423, 431 n.30 (1980).
245 S. 2699, 94th Cong. (1975).
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von Hirsch, and others.246 After much debate, the complete elimina-
tion of indeterminacy had “won out” (in Kennedy’s words) among the
Senate reformers.247 Although these proposals took four years to pass
the House, President Ronald Reagan signed the SRA into law on
October 12, 1984.248
Federal parole was consigned to history, inaugurating a new era
of determinate sentencing—or so everyone believed at the time. The
Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the SRA (the “Senate
Report”) had renounced indeterminate sentencing as “based largely
on an outmoded rehabilitation model.”249 It described uncertainty
over release dates, which had arisen as a consequence of this model,
as a “grave defect of present law,” because “no one is ever certain
how much time a particular offender will serve if he is sentenced to
prison.”250
After the SRA’s enactment, such uncertainty was supposed to
cease. Going forward, release dates would be firm and predictable.251
Prisoners sentenced to more than a year were still eligible for statu-
tory good time: They could earn a deduction of thirty-six days at the
end of each year (now fifty-four days) for complying with prison
rules.252 However, under the SRA, the good-time adjustment was
capped at a relatively low maximum, which applied to all eligible
offenders.253 Compared to the good-time system in place before the
SRA, which had applied different adjustment rates to different pris-
oners, this system was compatible with a determinist framework.254
The elimination of parole also meant the end of conditional
release. A prison sentence would end the day the prisoner left prison:
It would not spill over onto the street. Because of this, the SRA
required the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to ensure, to the extent pos-
sible, that “the last ten percent of a prison term is spent ‘under condi-
tions that will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust
to and prepare for his re-entry into the community.’”255 The BOP
246 S. 1722, 96th Cong. (1979).
247 Kennedy, supra note 244, at 431 n.34.
248 Stith & Koh, supra note 243, at 225, 266.
249 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221.
250 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 49 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3232.
251 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 56–57 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3239–40.
252 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2006) (as amended); Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2502–03
(2010).
253 18 U.S.C. § 3624.
254 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 146–47 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3329–30.
255 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 57 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3240 (quoting
proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)).
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would be responsible for providing these “transition services” during
the determinate prison term.256
IV
SUPERVISED RELEASE
When the SRA prospectively abolished parole, it created a dif-
ferent model of community supervision known as supervised release.
But “[u]nlike parole, a term of supervised release d[id] not replace
a[ny] portion of the [underlying prison] sentence . . . .”257 Instead,
supervised release would be imposed in addition to prison.258 In other
words, federal offenders were to begin a period of supervised release
only after serving the complete, determinate prison sentence.
In this Part, I chart the evolution of supervised release since its
enactment in 1984. I describe how supervised release began as a form
of non-punitive supervision designed for people in particular need of
post-release services. Before long, however, Congress adopted a
mechanism for revoking supervised release, which marked the return
of conditional release and indeterminacy. Once indeterminacy slipped
back into the system, it took firmer and firmer hold. I explicate the
rising indeterminacy of the system by outlining its current reach and
scope and the expanding body of conditions imposed. I also consider
the financial impact of modern-day supervised release.
A. The SRA and the Principle of Non-Coercive Rehabilitation
The SRA provided for three types of sentences: imprisonment,
probation, and fines.259 Judges had to impose at least one of these
options at every sentencing.260 The SRA also directed judges, in
deciding which of the three options to select, to consider the four basic
purposes of sentencing: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.261 Although judges always had to consult these four
purposes, not all purposes applied equally to every sentence. Any
judge who chose a sentence of imprisonment had to do so “recog-
nizing that imprisonment [was] not an appropriate means of pro-
moting correction and rehabilitation.”262
256 Id. 
257 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A(2)(b) (2012), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_7.pdf.
258 Id.
259 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2006).
260 Id.
261 Id. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
262 Id. § 3582(a) (2006).
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Supervised release, meanwhile, was a discretionary supplement to
prison, not a sentence in its own right. Only people who had been
sentenced to prison could receive a term of supervised release.263 For
community supervision without prison, judges would continue to
impose probation, rather than supervised release.264 But like proba-
tion, supervised release was to be overseen by judges, not an adminis-
trative agency.265 Under the SRA, the authorized maximum term of
supervised release was originally between one year and three years,
depending on the classification of the underlying offense.266
Because the prison term was determinate, the SRA explicitly lim-
ited the purposes of sentencing that courts could consider in deciding
whether, and how, to impose a term of supervised release. In imposing
supervised release, the court was explicitly not to consider the need:
(1) “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, [or] to provide just punishment for the offense”; or (2) “to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant . . . .”267 As the
Senate Report explained:
The term of supervised release is very similar to a term of proba-
tion, except that it follows a term of imprisonment and may not be
imposed for purposes of punishment or incapacitation since those
purposes will have been served to the extent necessary by the term
of imprisonment.268
When imposing supervised release, judges were to consider the
two remaining statutory purposes of sentencing—deterrence and
rehabilitation.269 Rehabilitation was defined as providing “needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner . . . .”270 In line with this,
according to the Senate Report, the “primary goal” of supervised
release was:
to ease the defendant’s transition into the community after the ser-
vice of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to
provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short
263 Id. § 3583(a).
264 Id. § 3561(a)(3).
265 Id. § 3583.
266 Id. § 3583(b).
267 These two factors, found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C) (2006), are missing from
the list set forth in the Act of Oct. 12, 1984, § 3583(c). Like the Senate Report, I use the
shorthand terms “punishment” and “incapacitation” to refer to these two statutory goals.
268 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3308.
269 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (D).
270 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
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period in prison for punishment or other purposes but still needs
supervision and training programs after release.271
The SRA provided for one mandatory condition of supervised
release: that the defendant not commit any federal, state, or local
crime.272 Judges could devise other conditions as well, but only if they
were “reasonably related” to deterrence and rehabilitation and
involved “no greater deprivation of liberty than [was] reasonably nec-
essary” for such purposes.273
Critically, although judges could set conditions of supervised
release, they could not revoke supervised release if the person did not
comply.274 This was consistent with the criticisms of parole by Judge
Frankel, the American Friends Service Committee, and other
reformers.275 Supervised release would provide rehabilitative services,
but not in the guise of the coerced cure. There would be no mecha-
nism to send violators back to prison with minimal process as a means
of trying to compel rehabilitation. In this way, the experience of being
on supervised release was to be fundamentally different from the
experience of being on probation or parole.
By contrast, a sentence of probation under the SRA remained
“conditional and subject to revocation until its expiration or termina-
tion.”276 Under the SRA, probation was a sentence in its own right—
an alternative to prison that provided an opportunity to avoid the dis-
grace and disruption of prison by complying with the conditions of
release that the court imposed.277 The procedures for revoking proba-
tion, codified in Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
remained largely the same before and after the SRA.
The sponsors of the SRA chose not to apply any of the infrastruc-
ture for parole and probation revocation to supervised release.
Instead, the SRA allowed judges to treat a violation of the conditions
271 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307.
272 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 3563(a)(1), 3583(d), 98 Stat. 1837, 1993,
1999 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(1), 3583(d) (2006)).
273 Id. at 1999–2000 (§ 3583(d)).
274 See Paula Kei Biderman & Jon M. Sands, A Prescribed Failure: The Lost Potential of
Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT. R. 204, 204 (1994) (“Because supervised release was not
to serve as a punitive measure at all, Congress deliberately excluded any provisions for
revocation proceedings.”).
275 See supra Part III.A (discussing criticisms by Judge Frankel and others of coercive
rehabilitation and uncertainty in release dates).
276 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, § 3564(e), 98 Stat. at 1994.
277 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 59 (noting the new approach of treating “probation as a
form of sentence with conditions rather than as a deferral of imposition or execution of a
sentence” (citing Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 3551, 3561, 98 Stat. 1837,
1988, 1992)).
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of supervised release as a criminal contempt.278 The Senate Report
cautioned, however, that judges were to hold offenders in contempt
only in the face of “repeated or serious violations of the conditions of
supervised release.”279
Criminal contempt was a very different mechanism than revoca-
tion. To prove contempt, the government had to show that “the defen-
dant willfully violated a decree that was clear and left no uncertainty
in the minds of those that heard it.”280 Moreover, the government had
to prove all elements of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable
doubt, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence.281 Criminal
contempt required trial by jury (for all cases involving a sentence of
more than six months),282 along with all the other procedural
protections applicable in a criminal proceeding.283 Thus, by providing
for criminal contempt rather than revocation, the SRA reinforced the
distinction between supervised release on the one hand, and parole
and probation on the other. The latter were discretionary alternatives
to imprisonment and thus could be revoked, with prison imposed in
their stead. Supervised release could not be revoked in favor of
prison, because it was not an alternative to prison. Rather, a violation
of supervised release could only result in reimprisonment if it rose to
the level of a new crime—the criminal disregard of a court order.
B. The Return of Revocation and Conditional Release
Even before the SRA went into effect in 1987, however, Congress
added a revocation mechanism. Change came in the form of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA),284 a statute that created new
mandatory minimum penalties for drug dealers and implemented the
now-repealed hundred-to-one sentencing disparity between crack and
powder cocaine.285 Although much less sensational, the Act also
278 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, § 3583(e)(3), 98 Stat. at 2000.
279 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125.
280 In re Gates, 600 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Linney, 134
F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1998)).
281 See United States v. Mourad, 289 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2002).
282 See United States v. Agajanian, 852 F.2d 56, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that there
is no right to a jury trial in contempt cases where the government specified that the sen-
tence would not be more than six months and the actual penalty was three months); United
States v. Pina, 844 F.2d 1, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that when a sentence for contempt
exceeded six months, the defendant is afforded a jury trial).
283 See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (1994)
(“Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense . . . and criminal penalties may not be
imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution
requires of such criminal proceedings.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
284 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.
285 Id. at 3207-2 to -3 (§ 1002).
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inserted a critical new paragraph into the supervised release statute as
one of several “miscellaneous technical amendments.”286 This new
provision allowed the court to:
revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person to serve
in prison all or part of the term of supervised release without credit
for time previously served on post[-]release supervision, if it finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the person violated a con-
dition of supervised release, pursuant to the provisions of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that are applicable to proba-
tion revocation and to the provisions of applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission.287
With this “technical amendment” and the revocation mechanism
it created, Congress brought back conditional release. In enacting the
ADAA, however, little consideration seems to have been given to the
conceptual differences between supervised release and probation
incorporated into the SRA. The adoption of the revocation mecha-
nism did not even warrant a separate header to draw attention to the
change.
The concept of revocation had been proposed in an earlier bill. In
1985, Senator Strom Thurmond, the chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, had introduced the very same revocation mechanism at
the request of the Department of Justice.288 This was one of several
changes the Department had suggested to address what were charac-
terized as small and technical problems in the implementation of sen-
tencing reform. According to the Department of Justice, this
revocation mechanism implemented a suggestion by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts for a “streamlined
procedure for enforcing the conditions of supervised release.”289
The U.S. Parole Commission had also been pressing for a revoca-
tion mechanism. In a March 1985 position paper, Benjamin F. Baer,
then chair of the Commission, criticized the contempt mechanism for
supervised release as cumbersome, inefficient, and “much more diffi-
cult” than revocation under federal parole.290 Baer noted that under
the SRA, even probation could be revoked after a “simple Rule 32.1
hearing.”291 This disparity made no sense to Baer. He argued that
people on supervised release, having been jailed as dangerous
offenders, presented a greater threat to society than those on
286 Id. at 3207-6 to -7 (§ 1006).
287 Id.
288 131 CONG. REC. S7373, 7399–7402 (daily ed. June 4, 1985).
289 Id. at 7409.
290 Benjamin F. Baer, Position Paper on Post-Release Supervision 66 (March 1985) (on
file with New York University Law Review).
291 Id. at 67.
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probation. In advocating for the revocation of supervised release,
Baer did not frame his argument in terms of the critical discourse that
had underlain the passage of the SRA; rather, he wrote simply out of
concern for what made it harder or easier to put people back in
prison.
For those accustomed to parole and probation, the absence of a
revocation mechanism for supervised release seemed like an “imprac-
tical oddit[y].”292 Many actors in the system wondered how supervised
release could be effective unless courts and probation officers were
granted systematic leverage over offenders.293 And leverage had
always meant prison.
Procedurally, the ADAA grafted the revocation mechanism for
probation onto supervised release, ignoring the different theoretical
roots of those systems. Judges could now “revoke” a term of
supervised release after finding, by a simple preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the person had violated a condition of supervision. There
was to be no trial and no jury; courts were to apply the same rules of
diluted procedure applicable to parole and probation revocation
hearings.294
The supervised release statute continued to instruct judges not to
consider the goals of punishment and incapacitation when deciding
whether to impose—and now revoke—supervised release.295 And yet,
the possibility of revocation made supervised release indisputably
about punishment, oversight, and coercion. Judges and probation
officers296 were to gauge how well released prisoners were adjusting
with the threat of more prison hanging overhead. Despite the statu-
tory bar on punishment, people on supervised release could now be
sent back to prison for conduct that did not even violate a federal
criminal statute.
In revoking a person’s supervised release, the court could impose
a prison sentence of up to the entire original term of supervised
292 Harry B. Wooten, Violation of Supervised Release: Erosion of a Promising
Congressional Idea into Troubled Policy and Practice, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 183, 183 (1994)
(“[The] original concept of [supervised release] produced what appeared as impractical
oddities to those familiar with the parole system.”).
293 See Barbara Meierhoefer Vincent, Supervised Release: Looking for a Place in a
Determinate Sentencing System, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 187, 188 (1994) (noting that probation
officers have traditionally had the power to move for the “offender’s removal from the
community by initiating revocation proceedings”).
294 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1006, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-6
to -7; supra Part II.D (discussing the rights framework for federal parole and probation
proceedings).
295 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (c), (e) (Supp. V 1987) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006)).
296 In the federal system, people on probation, parole, and supervised release all report
to “probation” officers.
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release.297 Practically speaking, this meant a maximum of between
one and three years in prison on a revocation when the underlying
offense fell under Title 18. For drug trafficking offenses under Title 21,
the ADAA created separate mandatory minimum terms of supervised
release, ranging from two to ten years.298 Thus, the potential exposure
resulting from revocation was significantly higher for these crimes.
The enactment of mandatory minimum terms of supervised
release for drug trafficking crimes also introduced the possibility of
lifetime supervised release. The ADAA enumerated minimum super-
vised release terms for drug trafficking crimes, but it did not provide
for any maximums. Based on this silence, courts concluded that defen-
dants convicted under the drug trafficking laws could receive terms of
up to lifetime supervised release.299
In 1987, when supervised release first went into effect, Congress
made two significant changes. First, Congress allowed judges to con-
sider the statutory purpose of incapacitation when making decisions
about supervised release, although the purpose of punishment was
still excluded.300 Second, judges could impose longer terms of super-
vised release for all Title 18 offenses, along with longer revocation
penalties.301 Any defendant convicted of a Class A felony, for
example, could receive up to five years of supervised release after
prison. If the defendant violated a condition of supervised release at
any time, he or she could be sent back to prison for up to another five
years.302
A 1994 statute adopted two other far-reaching amendments.303
First, the statute created new categories of violations for which revo-
cation would be mandatory. Courts would now have to revoke
297 Anti-Drug Act of 1986 § 1006, 100 Stat. at 3207-7.
298 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (imposing a term of supervised release between
five and ten years); id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (imposing a term of supervised release between four
and eight years); id. § 841(b)(1)(C) (imposing a term of supervised release between three
and six years); id. § 841(b)(1)(D) (imposing a term of supervised release between two and
four years).
299 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 559 F.3d 368, 369, 372 (5th Cir. 2009) (confirming
the possibility of lifetime supervised release in drug trafficking cases); United States v.
Sanchez-Gonzalez, 294 F.3d 563, 567 (3d Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Mora, 22 F.3d
409, 412 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).
300 Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 9, 101 Stat. 1266, 1267.
301 Id. § 8.
302 This statute increased the maximum supervised release term for A and B felonies to
five years (from three) and for C and D felonies to three years (from two). Id. When
supervised release was revoked, it also established maximum terms of reimprisonment for
violations of five years (A felony); three years (B felony); or two years (C or D felonies).
Id. § 25.
303 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 20414, 108 Stat. 1796, 1830–32.
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supervised release—and impose some sentence of imprisonment—if a
person on supervised release possessed a controlled substance or
refused to comply with drug testing.304 Second, the statute granted
judges explicit authority to order a new term of supervised release
following a period of reimprisonment for a supervised release
violation.305
C. Indeterminacy and the Courts
Defendants in revocation proceedings began challenging the
application of these amendments to their cases on ex post facto
grounds.306 Typically, a defendant would argue that the court had to
apply the version of the supervised release statute that had been in
effect on the date of his or her crime. The government, on the other
hand, would argue that the court had to apply the (generally more
punitive) amended version in effect at the time of the violation.
These cases required courts to engage in a structural examination
of supervised release revocation. When a court revoked supervised
release and returned an offender to prison, what exactly was the new
prison term for? Courts needed to answer this question before
deciding what version of the supervised release statute to apply. If the
punishment was for the violation of the supervised release conditions,
there was no ex post facto difficulty in applying the statute as
amended. However, if the punishment was for the underlying crime,
applying the amended statute would create retroactivity problems.
Over several years, the courts of appeals decided a number of
important supervised release cases, including a 1994 case, United
States v. Meeks.307 In this case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
had to decide whether a mandatory minimum sentencing provision,
added to the supervised release statute in December 1988, applied to
someone whose crime had occurred before the date of the amend-
ment.308 Meeks had sold cocaine to an undercover officer in March
1988. At judgment, the district court sentenced him to thirteen months
304 Id. at 1831.
305 Id.
306 The Constitution prohibits Congress from enacting any “ex post facto Law.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. “[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is . . . on whether [a
legislative] change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by
which a crime is punishable.” Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995).
307 25 F.3d 1117 (2d Cir. 1994).
308 Id. at 1119. Under this mandatory minimum provision, which was repealed in 1994,
judges were required to imprison anyone on supervised release found guilty of possessing a
controlled substance. The imprisonment would be for at least one-third of the supervised
release term. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7303, 102 Stat.
4181, 4464.
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in prison for this crime followed by three years of supervised release.
In 1993, the same court found that Meeks had violated the conditions
of his supervised release by testing positive for cocaine and failing to
note this cocaine use in monthly reports to the probation officer. As a
result, applying the mandatory minimum provision, the court sen-
tenced Meeks to a new term of twelve months in prison.309
In so doing, the district court found that the December 1988
amendment applied to the 1993 revocation proceeding because “the
violation of supervised release is a separate and distinct offense from
the original offense.”310 The Second Circuit reversed, finding the
opposite: “[W]e are persuaded that any provision for punishment for a
violation of supervised release is an increased punishment for the
underlying offense.”311 Accordingly, applying the mandatory min-
imum—enacted before the violation, but after the crime—violated the
ex post facto clause.
In approaching this issue, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
equated supervised release with parole, the very system that super-
vised release was supposed to replace. According to the court,
supervised release, like parole, was an “integral part of the punish-
ment for the underlying offense,”312 as under both systems, the defen-
dant “serves a portion of a sentence in prison and a portion under
supervision outside prison walls.”313 Under established parole prece-
dent, a statute enhancing penalties for parole violations could not be
applied to anyone whose underlying offense predated the statute. The
court extended this rule to supervised release, finding no reason to
distinguish between the two systems.
The court in Meeks conflated two different sentencing systems.
First, as I have discussed, judges were not to consider “punishment” at
all in imposing or revoking supervised release, much less treat it as an
“integral part of the punishment for the underlying offense.”314
Second, while parole and supervised release do both involve succes-
sive periods of imprisonment and community supervision, the char-
acter of supervision is different under the two systems. A person
released on parole is granted early and conditional release from a still-
existing prison sentence. Because of this, a violation of parole natu-
rally relates back to the original offense: Any recommitment for a
309 Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1118.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 1123.
312 Id. at 1121, 1123.
313 Id. at 1121 (quoting United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 1993)).
314 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the supervised release statute’s exemption of punish-
ment from the purposes of imposing or revoking supervised release).
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parole violation requires the “retaken prisoner” to resume the original
prison sentence, not begin a new prison sentence. Those imprisoned
for supervised release violations, however, are receiving additional
time in prison, having already served the full original prison term.
External considerations may have encouraged the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals to relate supervised release violations back to the
underlying offense. Violations of supervised release were often based
on non-criminal conduct, such as the failure to report to a probation
officer. If revocation were treated as imposing punishment for the vio-
lation itself, these kinds of technical violations would pose a big
problem: How could people be sent to prison for behavior that was
clearly not criminal? The Second Circuit Court of Appeals avoided
this issue by concluding that any new prison term was not for the vio-
lation. The violator, the court held, was going back to prison for the
original crime.315
The Meeks court was also aware that fundamental constitutional
protections (such as the right to counsel, the protection against double
jeopardy, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
would be implicated in revocation hearings if it attributed the penalty
to the violation, rather than the underlying crime. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals defended the lack of such protections in the super-
vised release context by citing pre-SRA decisions about the lack of
such rights in probation and parole proceedings, again eliding super-
vised release with these structurally distinct concepts.316 The court
then used the absence of these rights in supervised release revocation
hearings to conclude that any punishment for a revocation had to be
part of the punishment for the underlying offense; otherwise the
system would be unconstitutional. Because basic constitutional pro-
tections do not apply in revocation proceedings, the court concluded
that “any enhancement of the punishment for the supervised-release
violation should be viewed primarily as an enhancement of the penal-
ties for the past acts, rather than for the subsequent acts.”317 The court
thus based its conception of supervised release on the kinds of proce-
dural rights that the district courts had been providing under Rule
32.1, instead of deriving its understanding from the actual conceptual
and statutory framework.
Most circuits to address the question agreed with Meeks, holding
that a penalty for a supervised release violation was not a penalty for
315 Meeks, 25 F.3d at 1122 (“If the individual may be punished for an action that is not
of itself a crime, the rationale must be that the punishment is part of the sanction for the
original conduct that was a crime.”).
316 Id. at 1123.
317 Id.
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the violation itself.318 Rather, it was a penalty for the underlying
crime, even if that crime had been committed years before. In United
States v. Wyatt,319 for example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
considered a double jeopardy challenge to the supervised release
statute. The court held that reimprisonment for a supervised release
violation only modified the penalty for the underlying crime and, as a
result, there was no double-jeopardy problem with also prosecuting
the violation as a stand-alone crime.320 In so holding, the court did not
reference the statutory directive that supervised release was not to be
used as punishment, because punishment was confined to the original,
determinate prison sentence.
In 1995, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Meeks
and Wyatt line of reasoning and distinguished between revocation of
parole and revocation of supervised release.321 The case, United States
v. Reese, involved an ex post facto challenge to the same mandatory
minimum sentencing amendment at issue in Meeks. The court held
that the mandatory minimum, imposed on offenders who possessed
drugs while on supervised release, could not be understood as “adding
more time to the sentence for the original offense . . . .”322 The court
reasoned that, unlike a parole violator, a supervised release violator
was being imprisoned for the violation, rather than the original
offense. Thus, there was no ex post facto problem in applying the
amended statute to the revocation proceeding.
Cases such as Meeks, Wyatt, and Reese revealed the instability
caused by grafting “revocation” onto supervised release. If the penalty
for breaching a condition of supervised release was deemed a penalty
for the violation itself, which seems intuitive, courts would need to
increase the due process protections that applied to revocation pro-
ceedings. To avoid these constitutional problems, the penalty had to
be attributed to the original offense, which collapsed structural and
historical distinctions between supervised release and parole.
318 See, e.g., United States v. Eske, 189 F.3d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding an ex post
facto violation because the court increased the quantum of punishment beyond what was
available at the time the underlying crime was committed); United States v. Lominac, 144
F.3d 308, 316 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court could not apply supervised
release provision that became effective after date of underlying crime); United States v.
Collins, 118 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997) (same).
319 102 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 1996).
320 Id. at 245. The Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had rejected similar ex post facto
challenges to the supervised release regime. United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359 (4th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Acuna-Diaz, 1996 WL 282262 (10th Cir. May 29, 1996) (unpub-
lished decision); United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 1995).
321 United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 1995).
322 Id. at 590.
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In 2000, the Supreme Court addressed the question in Johnson v.
United States,323 which involved an ex post facto challenge to the
supervised release statute. The amendment at issue in Johnson,
adopted in 1994, empowered courts to order a new term of supervised
release after a defendant served a prison sentence based on an earlier
revocation.324 Johnson had committed federal credit card fraud in
1993 and was sentenced to twenty-five months in custody and three
years of supervised release. After his release from federal prison in
1995, he violated the terms of his supervised release in 1996 by com-
mitting four state forgery offenses and leaving the judicial district
without permission. As a result of these violations, the federal district
court revoked Johnson’s supervised release and sentenced him to
eighteen months in prison followed by twelve more months of super-
vised release.325 On appeal, Johnson argued that the 1994 amendment
did not properly apply to him and that the court should not have
ordered the new term of supervised release.
The Supreme Court agreed that the amended statute did not
apply. The Court concluded that all post-revocation penalties had to
be attributed to the original federal credit card fraud conviction rather
than to the 1996 supervised release violations. Accordingly, the Court
determined that the amended statute would be an ex post facto law if
applied to Johnson.326
The Supreme Court’s reasoning was driven by the same instru-
mental analysis that animated the Second Circuit in Meeks. The revo-
cation penalty had to be attributed to the original offense or else the
existing supervised release revocation system would be unconstitu-
tional. Citing cases like Meeks and Wyatt, the Court reasoned:
While [the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’] understanding of
revocation of supervised release has some intuitive appeal, the
Government disavows it, and wisely so in view of the serious consti-
tutional questions that would be raised by construing revocation
and reimprisonment as punishment for the violation of the condi-
tions of supervised release. Although such violations often lead to
reimprisonment, the violative conduct need not be criminal and
need only be found by a judge under a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Where
the acts of violation are criminal in their own right, they may be the
basis for separate prosecution, which would raise an issue of double
jeopardy if the revocation of supervised release were also
323 529 U.S. 694 (2000).
324 Id. at 698 (citing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994).
325 Id. at 697–98.
326 Id. at 701.
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punishment for the same offense. Treating postrevocation sanctions
as part of the penalty for the initial offense, however (as most courts
have done), avoids these difficulties.327
The Court chose to “avoid” these due process problems, but at
the cost of disregarding the policy impetus behind the creation of
supervised release. The Court found that its decision in Johnson was
“all but entailed” by its own prior summary affirmation of a parole
case that had also dealt with an ex post facto issue.328 In drawing on
this case as direct precedent, Johnson (like Meeks and Wyatt) ignored
the fact that when parole is revoked, there is no need to impose any
new period of imprisonment; the parolee is “retaken” to finish out the
still-extant sentence on the original crime. Thus, there is no question
that the punishment for a parole violation (the resumption of the
original prison sentence) is part of the punishment for the original
crime.329 Supervised release, however, was supposed to be different.
After Johnson, the supervised release system became structurally
indeterminate in the classic sense. When a court imposed supervised
release at sentencing, a defendant received what only could be
described as an initial prison term for the crime at the time of judg-
ment, followed by a conditional release. If the defendant failed to
“adjust” properly in the future and violated a condition of supervised
release, the court could extend the initial prison term.
D. The PROTECT Act
In another important development, the PROTECT Act of 2003
increased prison terms for multiple supervised release revocations,
further expanding the indeterminacy of the system.330 This statute,
whose full title was the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, was targeted
specifically at sex offenders. Among its many provisions, the statute
authorized lifetime supervised release for certain federal sex crimes,
327 Id. at 700 (citing United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 244–45 (7th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 854, 859–60 (7th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Withers, 128 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1123
(2d Cir. 1994); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)).
328 529 U.S. at 701. In one of the cases Johnson cites, Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp.
644, 646 (D. Mass. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 713 (1968), the Court had affirmed a lower court
decision, finding that it would violate the ex post facto clause to apply a new statute
imposing sanctions on parole violators to a prisoner sentenced before its enactment.
329 In his dissent in Johnson, Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s equation of parole
with supervised release—in the separate context of objecting to the majority’s conclusion
that the supervised release statute in effect at the time of Johnson’s original crime author-
ized post-revocation supervised release (even before the 1994 amendment). Johnson, 529
U.S. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
330 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 651.
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including the possession of child pornography. Another amendment in
the PROTECT Act had a much broader effect, lengthening the poten-
tial terms of reimprisonment for cumulative violations of the condi-
tions of supervised release for all defendants.331
Before the PROTECT Act, the maximum possible term of reim-
prisonment for sequential supervised release violations was limited by
an aggregation requirement. Judges had to “subtract the aggregate
length” of any and all prior terms of reimprisonment (that is, impris-
onment following prior revocations of supervised release) from a
stated statutory cap on total reimprisonment.332 This statutory cap
ranged from five years of reimprisonment in a case involving an
underlying Class A felony to one year of reimprisonment in a case
involving an underlying misdemeanor.333 Once the statutory cap had
been reached, judges could no longer use prison as a sanction for vio-
lations of supervised release.334
The PROTECT Act eliminated the prison aggregation require-
ment. As amended, the statutory cap for reimprisonment applies to
any one supervised release revocation. In cases in which a defendant’s
supervised release previously has been revoked, courts are no longer
required to aggregate the time served on the prior revocations. Each
revocation is now potentially subject to a new reimprisonment term of
between one and five years—without regard to any statutory aggre-
gate maximum.
Despite the significance of this change, the legislative history of
the PROTECT Act includes only the barest reference to the amend-
ment. The provision appears to have originated in a proposal by the
Department of Justice. During a House Judiciary Subcommittee
hearing on a related bill, Daniel P. Collins, an Associate Deputy
Attorney General, testified:
To ensure the efficacy of the reform proposed in [S]ection 101
[of the Act], we recommend that the Subcommittee make a con-
forming change in the provisions governing reimprisonment fol-
lowing the revocation of supervised release. Currently, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) limits imprisonment following revocation to five years
in case of a class A felony, three years in case of a class B felony,
two years in case of a class C or D felony, and one year otherwise.
This provision should be amended to make it clear that these are
limitations on reimprisonment based on a particular revocation,
331 Id. § 101.
332 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED
RELEASE 45 n.213 (2010) (citation omitted).
333 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2000) (amended 2003).
334 Id.
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rather than limits on aggregate reimprisonment for an offender who
persistently violates release conditions and is subject to multiple
revocations on that basis. This clarification could be effected simply
by inserting “on any such revocation” after “required to serve” in 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).335
Collins was discussing the amendment specifically in relation to
Section 101 of the Child Abduction Prevention Act, which was incor-
porated into Section 101 of the PROTECT Act, to cover “supervised
release term[s] for sex offenders.”336 Section 101 was the provision
that sought to authorize lifetime supervision for this category of crime.
As enacted, however, the DOJ amendment increases the potential
length of reimprisonment terms for all successive supervised release
violators, not just sex offenders. Based on a plain reading of the
statute, courts have rejected claims that Congress intended the
amendment to apply narrowly to sex offenders.337
The PROTECT Act dealt only with the term of imprisonment
that can be imposed for successive revocations of supervised release.
A separate section of the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(h), limits the amount of additional supervised release that can
be imposed after any particular violation of supervised release. Under
§ 3583(h), the new term of supervised release cannot “exceed the
term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that
resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of
imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised
release.”338
As the Sentencing Commission has emphasized, the § 3583(h)
limitation is significant for most Title 18 offenses for which the max-
imum authorized term of supervised release is one, three, or five
years.339 The provision has no impact, however, when the maximum
possible term of supervised release is life. Currently, this is true for
convictions under the federal drug-trafficking laws, terrorism offenses,
and many sex offenses.340 In such cases, there is no cap on a potential
lifetime cycle of reimprisonment for supervised release violations.
335 Child Abduction Prevention Act: Hearing on H.R. 5422 Before the H. Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 6
(2002) (testimony of Daniel P. Collins, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
336 PROTECT Act of 2003 § 101.
337 See United States v. Epstein, 620 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2010) (relying on plain text of
the amendment, despite “some uncertainty as to whether Congress intended the
amendment . . . to apply to all criminal defendants, or to sex offenders alone”); United
States v. Lewis, 519 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2008) (relying on plain language of amendment,
despite header that suggested provision applied only to sex offenders).
338 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (2006).
339 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 332, at 44–45.
340 Id. at 6 n.22, 45.
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E. Conditions of Supervised Release
The growing number of supervised release conditions has been
another factor in the ballooning indeterminacy of the federal sen-
tencing system. Twenty-five years after supervised release first went
into effect, the experience of being on supervised release has come to
mimic the experience of being on parole or on probation. The full
range of conditions that were developed for probation and parole now
routinely apply to supervised release. Each new condition imposes
additional demands and expectations on what it means to be suffi-
ciently “rehabilitated” to avoid the threat of more prison.
There are two basic categories of supervised release conditions:
mandatory and discretionary. Currently, only seven conditions are
mandatory. Of these seven, five apply in all cases: not committing new
crimes; not possessing controlled substances; cooperating in DNA col-
lection; submitting to drug testing (unless waived by the court); and
paying court-ordered fees and penalties.341 The remaining two condi-
tions apply only to defendants with qualifying convictions: a
registration requirement for sex offenders and a treatment require-
ment for first-time domestic violence offenders.342
The supervised release statute provides that judges may impose
other conditions. Such conditions might include any discretionary con-
dition of probation (as enumerated in the probation statute) or any
other condition that the court deems “appropriate.”343 First, however,
the judge must find that such a condition: (1) is “reasonably related”
to the background of the offense, the offender, or to one of the pur-
poses of sentencing (other than punishment); (2) involves no greater
deprivation of liberty than “reasonably necessary” for the relevant
purposes of sentencing; and (3) is consistent with the policy state-
ments of the Sentencing Commission.344
Despite these limitations, people on supervised release became
subject to a host of supposedly discretionary conditions, including
most of the discretionary conditions devised for probation. In addition
to the mandatory conditions, judges routinely apply a package of
thirteen “standard” conditions when imposing supervised release—
including, for example, geographic limitations, employment
requirements, reporting obligations, and a ban on associating with
felons. These “standard” conditions are among those recommended
341 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(a) (2012).
342 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2006).
343 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b), 3583(d) (2006). However, the discretionary condition of proba-
tion permitting intermittent confinement is not available for supervised release.
344 Id. §§ 3583(d)(1)–(3) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(b)
(2012).
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by the Sentencing Commission for both probation and supervised
release cases.345 Conditions that are supposed to be tailored are
instead reflexively imposed.
The thirteen “standard” conditions have been pre-incorporated
into Form AO-245B, the nationwide template for judgments in crim-
inal cases.346 By way of the AO-245B, people on probation and super-
vised release are mechanically made subject to exactly the same
thirteen standard conditions. This occurs despite the fact that super-
vised release conditions (unlike probation conditions) are not to be
imposed as punishment.
In laying out recommendations for the “standard” conditions of
supervised release, the sentencing guidelines state: “Several of the
conditions are expansions of the conditions required by statute.”347 In
actuality, none of the recommended “standard” conditions are
required by statute for supervised release; they are all expansions.
To supplement the mandatory and standard conditions, judges
can also develop “special” conditions of supervised release. The sen-
tencing guidelines recommend an array of thirteen special conditions
for consideration on a case-by-case basis. These include, for example,
substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, deportation, cur-
fews, home confinement, and occupational restrictions. Judges rou-
tinely develop other special conditions for individual defendants.
Examples of more controversial special conditions include shaming
sanctions,348 requiring defendants to take prescribed medications,
strict alcohol bans, and waiving the right to confidentiality for mental
health treatment.349
Sex offenders have been subject to particularly intrusive special
conditions. Some courts of appeals have upheld conditions that
include periodic polygraph testing; bans on all pornography and “sex-
ually explicit material”; penile plethysmograph testing to measure
345 For the guidelines’ largely parallel recommendations on “standard” conditions of
supervised release and probation, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 5B1.3(c), 5D1.3(c) (2012).
346 AO-245B (Rev. 9/08) Judgment in a Criminal Case.
347 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5B1.3(c), 5D1.3(c) (2012) (emphasis
added).
348 See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding a
condition that required a person convicted of mail theft to wear a sign that read, “I stole
mail. This is my punishment”).
349 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5D1.3(d)–(e) (2012); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 332, at 14, 17, 27–28 (describing commonly challenged
conditions).
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arousal; complete Internet bans; and broad associational bans to pre-
vent contact with any children.350
In general, probation officers have broad discretion in choosing
how strictly to enforce particular conditions and how to respond to
violations. The handbook for federal probation officers, Monograph
109: Supervision of Federal Offenders, does instruct probation officers
to respond to each and every violation.351 But the monograph lists
many possible responses, including, for example, a reprimand,
increased reporting, a curfew, punitive community service, home
detention, or requesting revocation from the court.352
More conditions, administered through this kind of unregulated
process, means less certainty about how long any defendant will spend
in prison for any given crime. The depth of probation officers’ discre-
tion, exercised largely behind closed doors, also raises all the old con-
cerns about disparity in punishment among defendants. It also raises
the possibility of the unequal treatment of minorities, the poor, and
the politically powerless, a central concern of the determinacy
movement.
F. The Rising Scope and Cost of Supervised Release
The reintroduction of indeterminacy and conditional release has
had far-reaching effect. Since the SRA was implemented in 1987, fed-
eral judges have sentenced approximately one million people to
supervised release.353 The most recent figures show that by the end of
2010, there were 103,423 people on supervised release and 206,968
people in the federal prisons.354 In 1991, at its most expansive, the
350 United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding a ten-year ban
on the use of the Internet without prior permission); United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915
(9th Cir. 2008) (upholding a ban on the possession of any materials depicting or describing
“sexually explicit conduct”); United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 2006)
(upholding mandatory polygraph testing); United States v. Roy, 438 F.3d 140 (1st Cir.
2006) (prohibiting the defendant from contacting his girlfriend without approval from a
probation officer, because the girlfriend had minor children); United States v. Dotson, 324
F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding the use of penile plethysmograph testing).
351 8E GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY AND PROCEDURES, SUPERVISION OF FEDERAL
OFFENDERS § 620.10 (2010).
352 Id. § 620.40. However, responses classified as moderate or severe require a report to
the court. Id.
353 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 332, at 3 n.13 (stating that 917,908 people
were sentenced between 1989 and 2009).
354 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES,
2010, at 8 (2011) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE];
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
2010 app. tbl.2 at 7 (2011) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES].
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federal parole system supervised 26,788 offenders,355 about one-fourth
of the number now on supervised release. In another significant
marker of the rise of supervised release, federal probation has
declined by about two-thirds since the passage of the SRA. Approxi-
mately 22,500 people are currently on federal probation,356 down from
a high of 61,029 in 1988.357 Supervised release is now the dominant
form of federal community supervision.
As suggested by these figures, federal judges are imposing super-
vised release at extremely high rates. Supervised release is required by
statute in less than half of all cases subject to the federal sentencing
guidelines.358 But even when there is no statutory requirement, the
guidelines provide that the court “shall order a term of supervised
release to follow imprisonment” when a prison sentence of more than
a year is imposed.359 Even after the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Booker,360 which made the guidelines advisory, nearly
everyone sentenced to federal prison is also sentenced to a term of
supervised release.361
According to figures collected by the Sentencing Commission,
judges imposed supervised release in 99.1% of cases in which it was
not statutorily required between 2005 and 2009.362 During the same
period, the average term of supervised release was forty-one months
(excluding offenders sentenced to lifetime supervised release).363 The
vast majority of offenders who avoided terms of supervised release
were non-citizens subject to deportation.364
The broad application of supervised release has meant that inde-
terminacy has taken a firm hold of the federal sentencing system.
Supervised release is responsible for sending a significant number of
offenders back to prison. Only about “two-thirds of federal offenders
successfully complete[ ] their terms of supervis[ed release].”365 A full
355 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS UNDER COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION 1987–96 (1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&
iid=884.
356 Id.; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 354, at
30.
357 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES,
1989, at 25 (1989).
358 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 332, at 3.
359 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1(a) (2012).
360 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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third have their terms revoked and are sent back to prison.366 In any
one year, roughly sixty percent of revocations are for non-criminal
conduct.367 Non-criminal violations, also known as technical viola-
tions, commonly include conduct such as failing to report to the pro-
bation officer, failing to submit monthly reports, and failing to attend
drug or mental health treatment. In general, among defendants who
were sent back to prison, the average term of re-imprisonment was
eleven months.368 In practical terms, given the possibility of revoca-
tion, and the frequency of reimprisonment, no one who receives
supervised release receives a determinate sentence. And almost eve-
ryone receives supervised release.
Not surprisingly, given the reach of modern-day supervised
release, the resources devoted to the system are substantial. The costs
of supervised release now aggregate to nearly $400 million a year.369
At a cost of $77.49 per day, moreover, the average prison sentence on
a revocation costs the government about $26,000.370 If one third of the
103,423 people currently on supervised release are likely to be reim-
prisoned, we can expect an additional cost—with respect to that
extant cohort of releasees alone—of $858 million (33,000 people ×
$26,000).371
In addition, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges have now
grappled with supervised release at over a million sentencing hearings,
adding enormous cumulative administrative costs to the system. Each
revocation proceeding adds to these costs, requiring a series of hear-
ings before the court, involving the probation officer, the prosecutor,
366 Id.
367 This figure comes from data reflected in Table E-7A, prepared annually to capture
federal judicial caseload statistics. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2011). The tables reveal that revocation was based on
technical violations in the following percentage of cases: 57.3% (March 2011 Table E-7A);
60.5% (March 2010 Table E-7A); 62% (March 2009 Table E-7A). Id.; ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2010); ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2009).
368 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 332, at 4. Of the 40,217 supervised release
cases that were closed during the twelve-month period ending on March 31, 2011, 34.3%
closed because supervision was revoked. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.E-7A (2011).
369 Pulling from the available figures: 100,000 people × $10.79 a day × 365 days =
$393,835,000 per year. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, NEWLY AVAILABLE:
COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND SUPERVISION IN FY 2010 (2011), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-23/Newly_Available_Costs_of_Incarceration_and_Super
vision_in_FY_2010.aspx (listing the costs of federal supervision).
370 Id.
371 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 354 at 8
(noting that 103,423 people are on supervised release); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, see supra notes 368–69 (reflecting that the average prison sentence for a revoca-
tion costs the government about $26,000).
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and defense counsel—all at so far unmeasured, but significant,
expense.
It cannot persuasively be argued, moreover, that the availability
of supervised release has indirectly led judges to impose shorter
prison sentences. In the years since the advent of supervised release,





In this final Part, I discuss ways to conceptualize the supervised
release system going forward. Drawing on the insights of the deter-
minists and indeterminists, I first identify four major elements of the
supervised release system as it operates today. I argue that supervised
release: (1) is structurally indeterminate; (2) restores broad discretion
to gauge rehabilitation; (3) is premised on coercive rehabilitation; and
(4) is the product of a steady expansion of control. I then propose
three alternative approaches for assessing supervised release in the
future: a crime-control approach, a transitional rehabilitation
approach, and an autonomy approach.
A. The Core Elements of Supervised Release
1. Structurally Indeterminate
Federal offenders sentenced to supervised release receive a sen-
tence with two components. First, they receive a fixed initial prison
term. Second, they are conditionally released from prison to a period
of supervised release, which renders the prison sentence on the under-
lying offense indeterminate.
In this Article, I have argued that supervised release creates a
classically indeterminate sentence. Under the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Johnson, discussed in Part IV, judges can impose more prison
time for the underlying offense if a defendant fails to demonstrate
sufficient rehabilitation after release.373 This structure is based on
post-release adjustment rather than adjustment during the fixed initial
prison term, but it mirrors the basic concept of indeterminacy set out
372 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 46 (2004)
(showing that in 1986, the average federal prison term was 26 months); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.14, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/sbtoc10.
htm (reflecting that the mean length of imprisonment for federal offenders was 53.9
months in 2010).
373 See supra Part IV.C.
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at the 1870 NPA Congress: The length of a prison sentence for an
offense should depend on satisfactory proof of subsequent
reformation.374
2. Restores Broad Discretion to Gauge “Rehabilitation”
Defendants sentenced to supervised release have no way of
knowing how long they will spend in prison: They are potentially sub-
ject to an extended prison term under summary process for any viola-
tion of the myriad conditions of release. Reimprisonment depends
substantially on the discretion of the court and its probation officers.
In the first instance, probation officers (who are employees of the
court system) must exercise their own judgment in deciding which vio-
lations to bring to the attention of the judge. Then, by statute and
under the federal sentencing guidelines, judges are given enormous
discretion in deciding what kinds of violations, for which defendants,
merit revocation and reimprisonment. In making revocation decisions,
judges are directed to consult only the broad statutory sentencing fac-
tors (with the exception of the purpose of punishment).375
Supervised release provides for a different form of indeterminacy
than the system proposed by Maconochie. Maconochie was a time
indeterminist, but he was a “marks” determinist. Prisoners would be
released after they had earned the requisite number of marks. The
number of marks they needed to earn, tabulated according to the seri-
ousness of their offense, would be disclosed to them upfront. Marks
were framed as a means of creating transparency and certainty for
prisoners and as a mechanism for reducing discretionary authority.
Indeterminacy came under attack in the 1960s precisely because
parole boards had abandoned any effort to create certainty or trans-
parency for prisoners. Prominent critics of parole, ranging from Judge
Frankel to von Hirsch, were animated by the cruelty and degradation
experienced by prisoners subject to arbitrary and obscure parole pro-
cedures. Like Maconochie, they denounced the practice of subjecting
prisoners to officials who held broad authority and were charged with
enforcing amorphous standards.
3. Premised on Coercive Rehabilitation
Supervised release, enforced by revocation and reincarceration, is
premised on the notion that rehabilitation (in addition to deterrence)
can be effectively generated by the threat of more punishment. As
374 See supra Table 1 (quoting Principle VIII).
375 See supra Part IV.B (describing the revocation authority for supervised release
violations).
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shown in Part IV, the typical offender on supervised release must
follow a minimum of five mandatory conditions, thirteen standard
conditions, and any additional conditions that the judge considers
appropriate.376 The failure to comply with any condition of supervised
release can be sanctioned by reimprisonment.
Supervised release conditions, like the conditions that applied to
tickets of leave and parole, grant the government a cheapened form of
leverage over people who have been previously adjudicated as
criminals. Nobody in the United States, for example, is permitted to
“unlawfully possess a controlled substance” or is authorized to
commit a “federal, state, or local crime.”377 In making these proscrip-
tions conditions of supervised release, Congress has not banned any
additional activities; it has just made it significantly easier to send
released “criminals” to prison for any alleged violation of existing law.
The second-class status of those on supervised release is further mag-
nified by the fact that releasees are subject to the same form of cheap-
ened control with respect to substantial amounts of non-criminal
conduct. This kind of control is what Jebb worried would brand
releasees as “belonging to a criminal class” and undermine their
reintegration.378
4. Reflects a Steady Expansion of Control
The supervised release system has expanded ever outward over
the last twenty-five years. The Senate Report on the SRA assumed
that judges would reserve supervised release for select offenders who
presented the greatest risks of recidivism.379 Today, nearly every
single person who is sentenced to federal prison also receives a term
of supervised release. The potential length of supervised release terms
has steadily increased, with a substantial number of defendants now
subject to the possibility of lifetime supervision.380 The available reim-
prisonment terms for violations have also increased.381 As the super-
vised release system expands, federal prison sentences become more
and more indeterminate, while release from prison becomes more and
more conditional.
376 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2006); see also discussion supra Part IV.E (describing the
different categories of conditions).
377 AO-245B (Rev. 9/08) Judgment in a Criminal Case.
378 Jebb, supra note 81, at 411; see also supra Part I.B (discussing Jebb’s philosophy of
reintegration).
379 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124–25 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3308.
380 See supra Part IV.B.
381 See supra Part IV.D.
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B. Three Alternative Approaches for Assessing Supervised Release
Based on these structural understandings of the current system, I
propose three different approaches for assessing the supervised
release system going forward. First, I suggest a crime-control approach
that might be invoked to justify the supervised release system as it
exists today. Second, I offer an approach to supervised release that
focuses on the goal of transitional rehabilitation. Third, I propose an
autonomy approach, which questions whether there has been a suffi-
ciently robust examination of the purpose and structure of supervised
release to justify its impact on those affected.
1. A Crime-Control Approach
The modern-day supervised release system is not grounded in any
clear set of principles. Rather, it consists of a hodgepodge of amend-
ments and procedures that were cobbled together by different actors
over many years. I have not found any case or law review article that
attempts to provide a coherent theory to explain the system as it cur-
rently exists.
Given the time period in which supervised release evolved, how-
ever, it makes sense to analyze the system as a crime-control
mechanism of deterrence and incapacitation. After all, process-
oriented concerns did not provide the sole motivation for the move-
ment to abolish federal parole. Those who pushed for passage of the
SRA included scholars and legislators who believed that parole pro-
vided too much leniency for prisoners in an era of rising crime.382 In
addition, although the SRA omitted both punishment and incapacita-
tion from the purposes of supervised release, Congress reincorporated
incapacitation as a purpose of supervised release in 1987.383 Locking
up “dangerous individuals” was the impetus behind the 1985 addition
of revocation, as least as articulated by proponents like the then-chair
of the Parole Commission.384
A theory of supervised release from this perspective might there-
fore draw on a version of the “broken windows” theory. This theory,
as articulated in an influential 1982 article by James Wilson and
George Kelling, suggests that targeting minor incidents of disorder—
such as panhandling, public drunkenness, and graffiti—can help con-
trol and prevent more serious offenses.385 According to Wilson and
382 See supra Part III.A (describing the debates that led to passage of the SRA).
383 Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 9, 101 Stat. 1266, 1267.
384 Baer, supra note 290, at 67.
385 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-3\NYU303.txt unknown Seq: 64 13-MAY-13 13:32
June 2013] INDETERMINATE SENTENCING RETURNS 1021
Kelling, “at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inex-
tricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence.”386 If one
broken window is not repaired, the rest of the windows will be
broken. The theory posits that the resulting disorder will leave the
neighborhood more vulnerable to crime.387
The supervised release system could be interpreted through this
lens. It could be argued, for example, that supervised release became
more control-oriented over time because society decided to focus its
enforcement resources on a particular group of people: those who had
demonstrated a past willingness to break the law. Under this theory,
any small violation could be interpreted as a sign of “disorder” that
might lead to more serious crime. Monitoring the visible behavior cov-
ered by supervised release conditions, such as the failure to report
one’s address or the failure to keep mental health appointments,
would keep the community safer as a whole.
This conception of supervised release is reminiscent of some of
the ideas expressed by Crofton. According to Crofton, summary revo-
cation powers, imposed for the remitted portion of the prison sen-
tence, created the community confidence necessary for the acceptance
of early release on tickets of leave.388 Because everyone knew that a
violation led to reincarceration, employers were more willing to hire
released prisoners. If any ticket-of-leave–holder exhibited disorderly
conduct—specifically by failing to report to the police on a monthly
basis, associating with “bad characters,” or leading an “idle and disso-
lute life”—the community would “assume[ ]” (in the words on the
ticket) that the releasee was “about to relapse into crime.”389 In this
way, monitoring compliance with the conditions became an early
warning system to protect the community down the line.
In the Irish Convict System, however, licensees were subject to
control in the community only during the period of early remission.390
The use of summary process, for either non-criminal or criminal mis-
conduct, did not extend beyond the expiration of the prison term. In
this way, the modern supervised release system is very different from
the ideas propounded by Crofton, as it continues penal control
beyond the period of punishment.
A crime-control theory of supervised release raises a number of
complicated issues. First, the “broken windows” premise is itself
386 Id. at 31.
387 Id. at 31–32.
388 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
389 CROFTON, supra note 60, at 11; see supra Part I.B (discussing the ticket-of-leave
system under Crofton).
390 See discussion supra at Part I.B.
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controversial. Scholars such as Bernard Harcourt have concluded that
policing data do not support the idea that targeting minor acts of dis-
order helps to reduce more serious crime.391 Second, it is not at all
clear that a broken windows theory, even if supported by policing
data, would translate into the supervised release context. Separate
data would need to be developed to demonstrate that controlling the
behavior covered by supervised release conditions would indepen-
dently reduce serious crime. So far, no such claim has been made.
A crime-control theory would also need to address the determin-
ists’ concerns about bias in a discretionary system. Kelling and Wilson
acknowledged, for example, that a broken windows theory of policing
raises serious equity concerns.392 They worried that factors such as
age, skin color, and national origin would become the basis for distin-
guishing the undesirable from the desirable.393 Although highly con-
scious of this problem, Kelling and Wilson stated that they had no
“satisfactory” response to concerns that the police might become
“agents” of community bigotry.394 The same concerns apply to
probation officers and judges, who have great discretionary power
over people on supervised release.
Furthermore, the crime-control theory would require an amend-
ment to the supervised release statute to recognize and acknowledge
that supervised release, as a form of conditional release, is by its very
nature punishment. Like its direct predecessors, the ticket of leave
and parole, supervised release extends punitive control over a class of
“criminals” who are subject to reimprisonment: (1) under reduced
standards of process and (2) for non-criminal conduct. Even if super-
vised release were framed primarily as a means of deterrence and
incapacitation, such a system would necessarily also be experienced as
imposing punishment.
2. A Transitional Rehabilitation Approach
Parole initially spread through the United States because a con-
sensus emerged that it was better to return an offender to freedom
“through a period of controlled liberty” than “abruptly to return him
to complete freedom” at the end of the prison sentence.395 There is
continuing value in this insight, particularly in light of the length of
federal prison sentences and the resulting challenges of reintegration.
391 Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New
York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 271 (2006).
392 Wilson & Kelling, supra note 385, at 35.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Note, supra note 98, at 702.
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Therefore it is appropriate to consider an approach to supervised
release in which transitional rehabilitation (and by implication suc-
cessful reentry) is the primary goal. In so doing, I examine four
aspects of the current system that could be reconceived to make
supervised release both constructive and coherent as a transitional
tool: (a) the relationship of conditional release to the custodial sen-
tence; (b) the use of summary process; (c) the conditions of supervi-
sion; and (d) the adaptation of behaviorist tools to promote
cooperative rehabilitation.
a. The Relationship of Conditional Release to the Custodial
Sentence
I have criticized the supervised release system for pretending that
sending people back to prison, even for non-criminal conduct, is not
punishment. If incarceration for a violation of supervised release is
indeed additional punishment for the underlying offense, a more
honest and transparent system for accomplishing this goal would be to
re-link conditional release to the remitted portion of a prison sen-
tence. Supervised release could essentially take the form of non-
discretionary parole. Every federal prisoner would spend a predeter-
mined period in the community under supervision at the tail end of
the prison sentence. Release would be automatic and would follow a
period of preparation and adjustment in a halfway house.
This approach would in effect create a split sentence of prison
and supervised release, but without the contortions of current law.
Because people on supervised release would still be under the control
of the BOP, summary revocation powers would be justified. As in the
old parole system, summary revocation would be co-extensive with
the period when the releasee would otherwise have been in prison.
Releasees would know that by violating the conditions of supervision,
they would be “retaken” by order of the court to serve out the balance
of the underlying prison term.
Unlike the old parole system, the period of supervision in the
community would be uniform and transparent at the time of sen-
tencing. For those sentenced to five years or more, for example, the
last year might be served under supervised release. The precise line
between prison and supervised release should be informed by the risk
of recidivism. Modern-day research has confirmed, for instance, that
the first six months after release—the period identified by
Brockway—is the critical period for reintegration.396
396 PETERSILIA, supra note 241, at 18 (noting that almost “30 percent of all released
inmates are rearrested for a serious crime in the first six months”).
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If the term of prison plus supervised release is openly described
as a split sentence, with the defendant remaining in the custody of the
BOP for the entire duration, then all the parties involved in the sen-
tencing process will be in a better position to evaluate their options
and make rational decisions. Congress will understand that a statute
that allows for lifetime supervised release creates the possibility of a
life sentence, with certain portions conditionally served in the commu-
nity. Prosecutors and defense attorneys will adjust the shape and focus
of their arguments to address the actual consequences of supervised
release. Judges will be better able to evaluate those arguments. And
defendants considering plea bargains will have access to clearer infor-
mation about the ramifications of those deals. Instead of considering a
sentence of, for instance, two years followed by a (somewhat indis-
tinctly defined) period of supervised release, all the parties involved
will know they are considering a sentence of, for instance, five years
with conditional release into the community after two.
b. The Use of Summary Process
If supervised release is not linked to a remitted prison term, I
would eliminate the use of summary process in revocation proceed-
ings. Under the present system, being on supervised release is not a
reward for conduct in prison, and it does not provide an opportunity
to avoid the experience or stigmatization of incarceration. Thus, sum-
mary process in revocation proceedings under the Morrissey stan-
dards,397 cannot be justified for supervised release in the same way
that it was for probation and parole. Unlike supervised release, both
probation and parole were historically conceived as acts of grace that
shortened or replaced time in prison.
Under this idea, the punishment for a supervised release viola-
tion would constitute a separate penalty for the violation itself, rather
than a continuing penalty for the underlying crime. In this way, the
prison term imposed for the crime at judgment would be determinate.
Full process would be required before a court could impose a new
prison term for a subsequent violation of the conditions of supervised
release. Full process rights during revocation proceedings would
reduce, but not eliminate, uncertainty for defendants about how much
time they might spend in prison for failing to “rehabilitate” after
release.
Extending full process rights to revocation hearings would not
eliminate the purpose of revocation, nor would it take us back to the
status quo of the SRA. Congress and the courts could still define
397 See the discussion of the Morrissey standards supra Part II.D.
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bodies of conduct that would render a releasee, but not other citizens,
subject to reimprisonment. Extending full process would also reverse
the ex post facto analysis applicable to the amended supervised
release statutes, because punishment for a violation could be con-
strued as just that, instead of being awkwardly attributed back to the
original crime.
The writings of the indeterminacy movement are a valuable
resource in thinking about other potential benefits of eliminating sum-
mary process. In 1837, Maconochie denounced summary process as a
“snare” and a source of degradation for prisoners.398 In 1870, the NPA
warned: “There is no greater mistake in the whole compass of penal
discipline, than its studied imposition of degradation as part of punish-
ment.”399 In this vein, the elimination of summary process could be
conceived as a reintegrative measure. Full process could push back
against the degradation of former prisoners who have completed their
prison terms and are being reintegrated into the community.
c. The Conditions of Supervision
A third idea would be to rework the conditions of supervised
release. Despite the mounting body of conditions, there has been little
analysis of the purpose underlying these conditions or the justification
for applying them so broadly.
Conditions of supervision should be revamped even if summary
process is eliminated or cabined. Courts should make individualized
determinations about what conditions should apply in each case. In
evaluating the utility of any particular condition, courts should distin-
guish between conditions that are aimed simply at establishing control
over “criminals” and conditions that provide reintegrative services,
such as job-training or mental health treatment. They should consider
the regulatory and administrative costs of any condition they impose
and require proof that this condition will actually lead to some desired
societal goal.
In deciding which conditions to impose, courts also should be
cognizant of the potentially corrosive impact of degradation. The bar
on associating with felons without permission, for example, denigrates
felons as a tarnished breed, even though the supervisees themselves
are almost all felons. Supervisees currently have to submit monthly
398 MACONOCHIE, supra note 29, at 22.
399 Declaration of Principles Adopted and Promulgated by the 1870 Congress of the
National Prison Association, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON
PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 542 (E.C. Wines ed., Albany, The Argus
Company 1871); see supra Table 1 (discussing Principle XIV).
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“truthful” reports to probation officers.400 They have to urinate regu-
larly in a cup.401 They must submit to visits from probation officers
without notice at home, at work, or anywhere else.402 They have to
ask permission to travel out of district.403 These conditions do not
need to be applied in every case.
Courts should also make clear at the time of judgment which con-
ditions will subject a person to potential reimprisonment. Under the
Australian and Irish ticket-of-leave systems, which operated with
many fewer conditions, any violation was a basis for revocation.404
Although this principle theoretically applies to our current supervised
release system, not all judges would put someone in prison for failing
to support dependents (if indigent), associating with family members
who are felons, submitting a monthly report late, getting drunk once
at a party, or serving as a police informant without prior
permission.405 Instead of leaving open the possibility of reincarcera-
tion for these kinds of activities, which shifts open-ended power to the
courts, the original judgment should demarcate each and every condi-
tion that might lead to reimprisonment as opposed to some lesser or
differently structured consequence.
d. Adapting Behaviorist Tools
A fourth idea would be to rework the behaviorist framework
embodied in the supervised release system. If the goals of supervised
release are indeed rehabilitative, as the current statutes and guidelines
provide, then we should draw on the best of behaviorist thinking to
structure incentives and sanctions in a manner that actually encour-
ages the behavior we purport to desire.406
Within this framework, both the conditions of release and the
incentives and sanctions imposed in connection with those conditions
could be reconceptualized in an effort to harness the active coopera-
tion of the releasee. Incentives and sanctions could be relatively small.
There could be a requirement that they be clear, transparent, and





404 See supra Parts I.A & I.B (discussing the Australian and Irish ticket-of-leave
systems).
405 See AO-245B (Rev. 9/08) Judgment in a Criminal Case (listing standard supervised
release conditions).
406 Whether or not to maintain the threat of reincarceration for punishment alone impli-
cates a different set of moral, penological, and political questions. My point is that if we
continue to believe that supervised release has non-punitive goals—and the current statute
provides it has only non-punitive goals—those goals should draw on behaviorist thinking.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-3\NYU303.txt unknown Seq: 70 13-MAY-13 13:32
June 2013] INDETERMINATE SENTENCING RETURNS 1027
uniform. Judges and probation officers could announce the incentives
and sanctions beforehand and apply them immediately.
The nineteenth-century mark system was premised on these
ideas: Incentives and sanctions should be transparent, measured in
small increments, and applied immediately. Although the societal
goals associated with the mark system were overwhelmingly labor-
based, the insights of this system remain relevant and could be applied
to different sets of societal ambitions. With respect to sanctions,
classic deterrence theory maintains that “the threat of a mild punish-
ment imposed reliably and immediately has a much greater deterrent
effect than the threat of a severe punishment that is delayed and
uncertain.”407 The same principle applies to incentives. Behavioral
economists have demonstrated that there is a common human ten-
dency to respond to immediate burdens and rewards (even if small)
and to discount (even larger) burdens and rewards that arrive in the
future.408
A new community supervision program, Hawaii’s Opportunity
Probation With Enforcement (HOPE), has achieved success in har-
nessing these ideas. Launched in 2004, HOPE’s central premise
involves imposing certain, predetermined, and relatively mild sanc-
tions (generally a few days in prison) on probationers immediately
after a positive drug test.409 The judge provides each probationer with
formal notice of the sanction in open court, and that sanction is
applied swiftly after any positive test.410 An evaluation of HOPE, pub-
lished by Angela Hawken and Mark Kleiman in 2009, supports the
effectiveness of this program.411
HOPE focuses on sanctions, rather than on incentives. Using
incentives as well as sanctions increases the tools available to the
courts at sentencing. An additional benefit of incentive-based initia-
tives, moreover, is that they are less likely to degrade offenders and
more likely to promote reintegration.
407 Jeffrey Rosen, Prisoners of Parole, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 10, 2010, at 36, 38.
408 Id.; IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET
THINGS DONE 7 (2010).
409 See ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, MANAGING DRUG INVOLVED
PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND CERTAIN SANCTIONS: EVALUATING HAWAII’S HOPE 27
(2009) (describing the HOPE process).
410 Id. 
411 Id. at 17–26 (describing the results of their evaluation). Oregon also has achieved
low recidivism rates by applying swift and certain sanctions for violations. Probation
officers in Oregon use a “sanctioning grid to impose swift, certain consequences for viola-
tions” and to “creat[e] consistency across offenders.” PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE
OF RECIDIVISM: REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 20 (2011), available at http://
www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx?id=85899358613.
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Courts and probation officers, therefore, should solicit empirical
research on the use of incentives as an alternative to sanctions.
Targeted incentives, such as those advocated by the indeterminists,
may prove more adept at changing behavior at least with respect to
certain types of conditions. In a controlled study, for example,
releasees who have a history of drug abuse might earn a payment (of
say $25) each time they meet with their probation officers and test
negative for drugs. If such a strategy proved effective, it would counsel
against using even a short term of reimprisonment as an enforcement
strategy for this condition. Not all conditions are best enforced by the
same blunt tool, especially when this tool interferes with reintegration.
A careful consideration of incentives and sanctions would be
another way to assess the utility of individual conditions. Would courts
let someone earn $25, for example, for each day that he or she
refrained from associating with a felon? How would that decision be
affected if the person’s spouse or child was a felon? If courts did not
want to spend $175 a week in promoting compliance with this condi-
tion—even if $175 a week was just the right amount to change
behavior—this condition arguably should not be imposed.
In addition to incentives and sanctions, I propose a careful exami-
nation of other behaviorist tools. Both Maconochie and Crofton
emphasized, for example, that true reform was only possible if pris-
oners cooperated in their own amendment.412 To encourage this, they
relied not only on concrete rewards and penalties, but also on factors
such as enhancing due process protections and increasing the per-
ceived fairness of the system.
Tom Tyler has argued that people are much more likely to coop-
erate with the law when they accept the law’s legitimacy.413 He has
shown how people’s perceptions of legitimacy are deeply impacted by
their experiences of procedural justice. Tyler’s insight—that coopera-
tion with the law is more closely linked to an internalized acceptance
of the law’s legitimacy than to the externalized imposition of sanctions
or rewards—should be integrated into the supervised release
system.414
3. An Autonomy Approach
A third way of approaching supervised release is to question
whether, given the lack of clear consensus as to the purpose of the
412 See supra Parts I.A & I.B (describing Maconochie and Crofton’s theories of indeter-
minate sentencing).
413 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178, 276 (2006).
414 See id. at 162–63.
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current system, a sufficiently robust democratic determination has
been made to justify its impact on the autonomy of released prisoners.
Congress has never considered the issue facially; rather, the current
system has evolved through a patchwork of technical amendments and
court decisions, the overall structure of which has been largely misun-
derstood. Both the crime control approach and the transitional reha-
bilitation approach could be criticized on this front.
As an alternative idea, I therefore propose that we consider
whether supervised release in its present form should be completely
eliminated. Defendants would serve their full prison terms, minus any
good time allowances, and then the possibility of prison would be
over. Release dates would be predictable and certain, transparency
would be restored, and the autonomy of released prisoners would be
respected.
In this way, punishment would be confined to the determinate
prison term. This would provide for a “good system of punishment”—
in the words of the British parliamentary committee that investigated
penal transportation in 1837—because at the end of the term,
prisoners would be considered to have “atoned” for their crimes.415
The Department of Probation could still provide post-release services,
including drug treatment and job placement, but participation in these
programs would be voluntary. This is reminiscent of the regime for
released prisoners advocated by Jebb in England.416
Abandoning conditional release and indeterminacy would not
mean abandoning efforts at reintegration. As advocated by
Maconochie, the prison sentence, itself, could be used for rehabilita-
tive treatment, job training programs, and preparing inmates for
release.417 As suggested by the Senate Report on the SRA, transition
services implemented by the BOP could replace post-release commu-
nity supervision as the primary locus of reintegrative efforts.418 Cur-
rently, however, the BOP does relatively little to provide these kinds
of services.419
415 SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at xxix. This, however, does not take
into account the many collateral consequences affecting people with felony convictions,
including restrictions on employment and access to government benefits.
416 For a description of Jebb’s philosophy, see supra Part I.B.
417 For a description of Maconochie’s philosophy, see supra Part I.A.
418 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 57 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3240.
419 In 2010, for example, only four percent of federal prisoners were in community cor-
rections centers (or halfway houses). See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 354, app. tbl.2 at 7. The BOP severely
restricts the number of inmates who may participate in its 500-hour Comprehensive Drug
and Alcohol Program. See Alan Ellis & J. Michael Henderson, Sentencing: Changes to the
BOP Residential Drug Abuse Program, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 2009, at 50 (describing sev-
eral categories of inmates not eligible for the program).
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If the ultimate goal is reintegration, for example, the sizable
resources that we now spend on supervised release might be produc-
tively transferred to job programs inside and outside prison. As Joan
Petersilia has documented, “[t]he majority of inmates leave prison
with no savings, no immediate entitlement to unemployment benefits,
and few employment prospects.”420 This kind of instability, a preoccu-
pation of penologists like Crofton and Brockway, is perhaps the big-
gest impediment to reintegration for a broad category of offenders
and must be addressed.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have traced the conceptual discourse that began
with the indeterminacy movement of the nineteenth century and led
into the determinacy movement of the twentieth century. I have
shown how misunderstandings of this historical discourse have been
incorporated into legislative and judicial decisions, resulting in the
conceptually unstable supervised release system we have today. Based
on this analysis, I have attempted to lay out a framework for under-
standing supervised release as it now exists. Without such a frame-
work, we cannot hope to make principled decisions about how
supervised release should be structured and experienced in the future.
420 Petersilia, supra note 8, at 5.
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